Employment Relations in Global Production Networks –
Initiating Transfer of Practices via Union Involvement?

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ABSTRACT
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) represent a still small but quite rapidly growing and particularly interesting contribution to the global regulation of employment relations. What is more, they enable global unions to become actively involved in co-designing employment relations within transnational corporations (TNCs) and their global production networks. Based upon theoretical insights into the difficulties to transfer practices in and across organizations we extend Szulanski’s model of practice transfer and confront it with empirical insights from a content analysis of 72 IFAs and 45 interviews with representatives of TNCs, global unions and other organizations.

Keywords: international human resource management; employee relations; industrial relations; international labour relations.

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INTRODUCTION

International Framework Agreements (IFAs) represent a still small but quite rapidly growing and particularly interesting contribution to the regulation of employment relations on a global scale. At the beginning of the year 2009, there were circa 80 international framework agreements (IFAs). An IFA is a formal contract between the central management of a Transnational Corporation (TNC) and a Global Union Federation (GUF) in which the corporation agrees at a minimum to comply with basic labour standards, in particular with the core labour standards established by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998). Since the most distinctive characteristic of IFAs is the recognition of global unions by TNC management at the headquarter (HQ) level, we argue that IFAs present an exemplary, but so far unexplored, case of external actor involvement in the company-specific internal transfer of practices of international human resource management (IHRM).

Practices, which originate at a ‘source’ and are either applied in the immediate environment of the source or, as is often the case in IHRM, transferred to other subsystems of an organization, are recurrent actions whose reproduction is made more likely by the help of routines, rules, procedures and similar institutions (Giddens 1984). Transfer or diffusion of practice in HQ-subsidiary relationships has become a major topic of IHRM literature (Brewster et al. 2008; Edwards et al. 2007; Tempel & Walgenbach 2007) and, most recently, even the involvement of external actors has been acknowledged (Collings 2008; Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). The issues covered range from implementation of various HRM policies such as financial participation, diversity management, or union recognition and non-unionism (Brewster et al. 2008; Ferner et al. 2005; Tempel et al. 2006) to internationalization strategies and corporate control (Harzing & Sorge 2003). In general, transfer of practice is an important issue for management research because it might reveal some insight about how institutionalization processes operate across organizational subsystems and whether a diversity of practices or, by contrast, an isomorphism according to one ‘dominant’ or ‘best’ practice will prevail in TNCs’ global production networks (Geppert et al. 2006; Pudelko & Harzing 2007). But how do external actors like trade unions in general and, in the case of TNCs, GUFs in particular, actually become involved in the practice transfer? And what is their impact in particular on the initiation of this process?
In this paper we draw on the practice transfer model developed by Szulanski (1996, 2000) and already applied to TNCs (Jensen and Szulanski 2004). Although we agree with Szulanski’s view that transfers must be analysed as processes, we argue that his model of the transfer of practices needs to be extended beyond the single enterprise to reflect the reality of global production networks. Even more importantly, given our focus on the transfer of IRHM practices, we emphasize in particular the role of both internal and external actors additional to management. By so doing, our paper contributes to the IHRM literature in two ways in particular: first of all by recognizing and examining the importance of (inter-)organizational processes and the systemic properties of practice transfer within and across organizations; and secondly, by analysing the role of this extended actors' constellation in defining policies and practices of transfer in TNCs and their global production networks. In contrast to several other studies (e.g. Scherer and Smid 2000; Bartley 2007), our study investigates how instead of why such transfers of practices are initiated. Moreover, we (re)introduce a core idea of industrial relations research into IHRM, namely the role of conflict and mechanisms of conflict resolution in the transfer of practices.

After presenting our extended and modified model of practice transfer we describe our methodology and report initial empirical findings from a document analysis of the content of 72 IFAs as well as 45 interviews with managers from HRM departments of TNCs, GUF officials and other experts. These findings show that in terms of Szulanski's model, the process stage of initiation needs to be analysed more thoroughly. This is because in a negotiated context involving an external actor the stickiness of practice transfer is already quite evident, Apart from the actor constellations in the formation of a practice, organizational forms established to support and monitor the transfer and the responsibilities assigned to each party of the agreement are crucial for the implementation. We conclude with a summary of the contributions of our study to IHRM and prospects for future research in this field.

TRANSFER OF PRACTICES WITHIN TNCs AND BEYOND: AN EXTENDED MODEL

In recent years, the debate in the international management literature about the divergence/convergence-dichotomy of TNCs’ business models and management practices has shown that the traditional expectation about TNCs’ capacity and capability to manage all of their subsidiaries in a
similar way is confronted by the reality of limited influence (Brewster et al. 2008; Dörrenbächer & Geppert 2006; Geppert & Williams 2006; Harzing & Sorge 2003). As a consequence, the idea that recurrent activities are easily and automatically transferred from home countries to different host country contexts – even if they are believed to represent ‘best practice’ – has lost much of its credibility, although maybe more among academics than among management practitioners (at least at the HQ level). A growing body of research from different perspectives (business systems approach, organizational neo-institutionalism, and micro-politics) has revealed why convergence towards one model of business conduct comprising of one distinct set of practices is unlikely to be observed empirically, even regarding such basic properties as the legal form of incorporation, labour usage and production technology (for a summary Geppert et al. 2006).

According to the business systems approach, it is the complexities and difficulties which result from the clash of divergent institutions in home and host countries that are responsible for ongoing divergence in business practices across countries and within TNCs. In a nutshell, the greater the institutional distance between a home and a host country the more likely is hybridization or adaptation of a given practice to local conditions. The result is a mixture of influences by local conditions and country of origin (Kostova & Roth 2002; Tempel & Walgenbach 2007). With regard to employment relations and IHRM, the extensive case study research on the conduct of US multinationals’ subsidiaries in several European countries by Ferner, Edwards, and colleagues provided insights on the political processes that are triggered by institutional distance and impede the straightforward dissemination of practices or modify the practices themselves (for a summary see Ferner & Almond 2006). With respect to employee voice and union representation studies, topics which are at the heart of IFAs, studies within this research program have revealed that the country-of-origin influence is severely weakened due to the resources subsidiary management can deploy in power plays with HQ management, albeit to differing degrees according to the strategic importance and type of the practice (Ferner et al. 2005; Tempel et al. 2006). A core finding of this research is that local actors, above all subsidiary management, can use local institutions as an explicit or implicit power resource to reshape initiatives on HRM policies originating from the HQ. Besides relative success, general organizational (inter-)dependencies and economic performance of the subsidiary, these resources include the
interpretation of institutional differences between home and host countries by local management, and local coalition building between unions and subsidiary management (or other forms of collusive alliances), for example in the case of restructuring. Such divergence is facilitated as differences in approach become more visible in cross-country dissemination and need to be adapted “through the prism of actors’ beliefs and interests at the macro-level of the organization” (Ferner et al. 2005: 723). In a dynamic perspective, the local solutions once found might spill-over in a path-dependent development which runs counter to the policies and ambitions of the HQ in an enduring way. These resources are explained to be a direct outflow of “institutional multiplicity” in which societal and organizational level institutions differ across the levels and countries of a TNC’s operations (Ferner et al. 2005).

On the one hand, research has moved from macro-institutional typification of national business models to more fine-grained micro (political) processes in which practices become internally adopted, reformulated and even transferred back from subsidiaries to HQs (Dörrenbächer & Geppert 2006; Geppert & Williams 2006; Bouquet & Birkinshaw 2008; Kostova et al. 2008). On this micro-level of HQ-subsidiary relations, political processes play an important role as do the resources of subsidiaries in relation to the resources and ambitions of HQs, in the form of local knowledge, expertise and contacts (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006), for instance. On the other hand, as Geppert et al. (2006) have argued, TNCs are increasingly exposed to transnational (global) regulation and institution-building which involves additional actors in the political processes of management. Nevertheless, home country effects can still be observed, in particular, if the practice concerned is closer to the strategic core of a TNC’s activities – or as in the case of those HRM practices that are particularly independent of the institutional environment. Even then, some sort of a dominance effect might also be at work, i.e. US management practices might be adopted by TNCs of other origins as a result of a more general economic hegemony of the US business system. In effect, the observation of country-of-origin effects becomes more difficult, since TNC originating from other countries are more likely to adopt US-style management practices wherever possible (Almond et al. 2006; Pudelko & Harzing 2007).
Although we want to downplay neither macro-institutional aspects nor individual influences in explaining the practice transfer observed, we emphasize the organizational processes and mechanisms in which transfer of practices take place. More precisely, we want to look more closely at the processes in which institutional divergences are translated into diverging – or converging – practices by different groups of actors situated in different institutional contexts. By so doing, we use the process-oriented approach of Szulanski (1996, 2000) as a starting point as this, more than many studies in IHRM, focuses on the processual and systemic properties of the transfer process.

Szulanski (2000: 17) defines the transfer of a practice “as an effort to create a partial or exact replica of a complex and causally ambiguous practice (…), that is, as a replica of a web of relationships connecting specific productive resources.” A practice transfer between a source (i.e. the HQ management) and a recipient (i.e. the subsidiary, supplier) usually takes some time, has to overcome organizational barriers, and is only completed when the recipient is able to replicate and reconstruct a practice according to a certain template, benchmark or standard. To underline the process character of transfers, Szulanski’s model consists of two stages, initiation and implementation, each of which has sub-stages. The stage of initiation – which is the focus of this paper – consists of uncovering possible gaps, finding and defining a practice to be transferred as a solution, and the actual decision to transfer this practice. The subsequent stage of implementation is divided into initialization (first application), the performance of the new practice and its gradual improvement through repetition, and finally a sub-stage of evaluation, which includes activities to refine the practice to fit recipient conditions and further developments.

A key determinant of how the transfer process unfolds throughout this process is the particular “stickiness” of an organization (Szulanski 2000: 12). By “stickiness” Szulanski is referring to several mechanisms, both systemic and actor-related, which influence the ability of a source to transfer and the capability of a recipient to replicate a given practice (including type of practice, motivation, absorptive and retentive capacity, the quality of the transfer relationship, and the organizational context). As a general conceptualization of practice transfer, Szulanski’s model incorporates important insights from organization research and provides a theoretically sound basis upon which to build our analysis of the transfer of employment-related practices as negotiated by TNC HQs with organized
representatives of the employees. However with regard to the analysis of practice transfer in TNCs and their global production networks, we argue that the initiation stage of Szulanski’s model, on which we focus, needs to be extended to include additional actors and processes.

The first point of extension concerns the constellation of actors within a TNC. Szulanski's model infers a kind of one-on-one relationship between HQ (source) and subsidiary (recipient), with each being presented as different parts of an otherwise homogeneous entity, i.e. management. We argue that in regard to the employment relationship, the transfer process may involve at least one additional group of internal actors, employees or their representatives. While Szulanski's model does include a substage of formation within the initiation stage in which stickiness emerges out of difficulties of management to identify gaps and possible solutions, there is no recognition of the possible existence of an employee voice in the formation process, for example in the form of voluntary participation by work groups or an employee representative body such as a German works council or a French comité d'entreprise, not to mention an external organisation such as a trade union.

A second point of extension we wish to introduce concerns the role of subsidiaries and their relationship to HQs. Since HQ management in TNCs is highly structured with diversified responsibilities and hierarchical power relationships, the transfer of HRM practices from the HQ to the subsidiaries could be directed by managerial fiat of central management. This is certainly true for so-called transplants, but it may also hold for TNCs that follow (in terms of internal organization) an integrated network approach allowing for much more distributed leadership (Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989). Such TNCs may well be considered to be “heterarchies” (Hedlund 1986) in which organizational practices, including IHRM practices may also emerge and spread from the periphery of the corporation. Even if such decentralized organizational forms may be controlled by fiat or, more precisely, are coordinated in the shadow of possible command and control (Delbridge and Ezzamel 2004), we think it is necessary to acknowledge that at least some subsidiaries may take a more active role than that of mere local adaptation. Such activity has been amply documented in regard to IHRM practices (Ferner et al. 2005), but most particularly in regard to TNCs of Scandinavian origin (Forsgren et al. 2005).
As TNCs bridge spatial, cultural, and organizational distances, they evolve into globally dispersed production networks, with complex supply chains and different, sometimes even plural forms of formal governance: hierarchy, market and hybrid (Gereffi et al. 2005; Bair 2008; Lane 2008; Garcia-Pont et al. 2009). Therefore, and thirdly, we argue that the model needs to be extended to recognize the importance of an inter-organizational dimension to include external actors in the model. Suppliers in particular are in this category, and, more generally, companies that are tied to the TNC via “relational contracts” (Macneil 1978). While market relations which are typically arms-length, often based on spot contracts, hardly allow for any transfer of practices (but rather rely on exit threats for compliance), relational contracts constitute “obligational contractual relations” (Sako 1992) which are the outcome and means of rather intensive inter-organizational interaction and which may offer better conditions for improving on employment conditions and relations (Fichter and Sydow 2002; Frenkel 2001; Frenkel and Kim 2004). For instance, obligational relations are more permeable with respect to mutual communication and understanding and involve a higher level of interdependence with a smaller number of suppliers, leading more often than not to the necessary support of suppliers by buyers that enable the former to comply with a certain labour standard (Stigzelius and Mark-Herbert 2009). As a consequence, not only intra-organizational sources of stickiness within the TNC are relevant, but also inter-organizational and external ones. One actor, external to global production networks as conceived here, are national trade unions and GUFs. Through this final extension, our approach has some similarity with Levy’s “contested fields” (2008: 948) and other approaches emphasizing the political construction of market institutions, including global labour standards (Bartley 2007).

Figure 1 summarizes our extended model of practice transfer in global production networks indicating (1) the importance of hierarchical fiat in initiating (and disseminating) practices, the design of which may be influenced by employee voice, either through means of direct participation or co-determination. This hierarchy-based concept of practice transfer has to be complemented by (2) the insight that at least some subsidiaries, particularly regarding IHRM policies, may well play an active part in the initiating (and not only the implementation) of practices in the TNCs as well as by (3)
acknowledging the different forms of governance to which suppliers are subordinated in global production networks. Finally, and most obviously, the extended model includes (4) GUFs and national unions as external actors who are likely to be involved in the initiating and implementing of practices, in particular labour practices, in global production networks. And it is the (institution of the) IFA, documenting a joint decision to transfer practices of employment relations, that gives the unions a formal role in a process which otherwise depends entirely on either corporate (CSR) strategy or the efficacy of global institutions such as the ILO.

RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

The actors involved on both sides of IFAs represent international or even global players: The average TNC in our IFA sample operates in 22 different international locations and employs a staff of around 95,000 people. On the union side, most GUFs have affiliates in over 100 countries and their aggregated memberships range between 12 and 25 million workers. A basic characteristic of all IFAs is a common understanding among the actors to voluntarily recognize and uphold employee rights as defined by the ILO core labour standards, to which such private actors are not directly legally bound. These cover the prohibition of child labour (ILO co. 138 and 182) and forced labour (ILO co. 29 and 105), and they establish the right to equal treatment ("non-discrimination", ILO co. 100 and 111), to freedom of association, and collective bargaining (ILO co. 87 and 98). However, although some IFAs even contain additional ILO conventions or voluntary guarantees on employment and labour conditions (e.g. employee representatives, wage policy, working time, health and safety, and social policy), the most distinctive characteristic of IFAs regarding the transfer of practices in employment relations on a global order is a procedural definition of a conflict resolution mechanism for labour related disputes. Seen this way, IFAs reflect all the elements of the initial stages of the practice transfer process discussed above.

To illustrate empirically the interplay between external actor involvement (GUFs), hierarchical HQ-subsidiary relationships and business strategies in terms of suppliers and employee involvement in the earliest stages of a practice transfer (initiation, formation), we focus on HQ management and the GUFs as the actors which have signed on to using IFAs as an instrument for a transfer of practice. In
particular, we look at the results of IFA negotiations as embodied in the agreements’ texts and their relationship to two explanatory factors:

1. HRM strategies with respect to employment relations in TNCs (and beyond),
2. The strategies of GUFs for concluding IFAs to improve labour standards.

Within the framework of practice transfer presented above, the initiation process of transfer through strategic negotiation is an analytically distinct phase, which nevertheless sets the stage for the practices applied in and across the organizations in the subsequent implementation phase. In focusing on the initiation phase, we use a quantitative content analysis of 72 IFAs as a measure of a decision to transfer certain practices (see Table 1). More specifically, we look predominantly at the actor constellation conducive for initiating IFAs and the procedural characteristics in terms of consultation and conflict resolution specified in the agreements to include employment related issues on the agenda. We believe these procedural rules defined by IFA agreements to be crucial for determining the properties of the practices to be transferred and replicated, and for defining a space for ongoing negotiations on different levels of TNCs.

Furthermore, to typify management and GUFs’ strategies in the formation stage of the decision to transfer, we examine the model agreements developed by GUFs for negotiations, and present insights from semi-structured interviews with representatives from GUFs and NGOs and, in particular, with managers of the HRM department involved in the formation and initiation of IFAs. Table 2 gives an overview of the interviews as part of an ongoing research project in which we will ultimately select four cases for an exploratory in-depth analysis of the initiation and implementation of IFAs, not only within the TNC but also at its major suppliers.

**TRANSFER OF PRACTICES WITHIN TNCs: FIRST EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS**

GUFs and HQ management are the most visible actors in the IFA process because there is no agreement without both of their signatures. But on a closer look, the actor constellation on labour’s side is characterized by diversity. Above all, the important role of two additional players is evidenced
by their signatures as well: national unions and the (European) Works Councils. Indeed, 72% of the IFAs in our sample include national/regional unions and (European) Works Councils as signatories. By comparison, the management side is clearly more homogeneously organized, because only HQ management, first and foremost represented by managers of central HRM, is directly involved in negotiating IFAs.

Labour’s organizational heterogeneity involves two dimensions of possible conflict impeding the process of practice transfer at an early stage, i.e. a horizontal and a vertical dimension: Horizontally, across national borders, company employee representative bodies, such as works councils, might pursue strategies which differ from those of national unions, which may also be competing over jobs. Vertically, interests of labour representatives might differ according to the company’s position in the global production network and the countries’ position in the global division of labour. In particular, production coalitions among capital and labour in the core industrialized countries might be in conflict with policies of local and national unions of more peripheral states. The challenge for GUFs in this context is to recognize these diverse interests, find a common thread for their articulation and bind the limited resources into a coherent strategy.

In the context of labour's organizational heterogeneity, the outcomes of such processes are bound to vary and thus we also must recognize the variety of strategies unions employ to establish an element of global labour relations through IFAs. Unions may rely on established channels of dialogue and negotiation and/or on more publicly visible activities such as campaigns and demonstrations to influence TNC HQ management. To disentangle this complex actor constellation in the initiation stage of the IFA process, we would need to make a detailed comparison of the quite different approaches to IFAs used by GUFs on the one hand as well as by HQ management on the other. But for reason of limited space, we focus here on evaluating the impacts of both on the procedures for monitoring and enforcement as negotiated in IFAs.

In our IFA sample we can distinguish three basic forms for organizing conflict resolution as an ongoing practice: First, a special group or committee for monitoring the IFA seems to document the intention to replicate negotiations (institutionalization) on an ongoing basis. Similarly, EWC
embodiment signals a measure of institutional support, but in comparison to a special body, it lacks a global operating mandate. By contrast, “meetings” represent a rather weak form of institutionalization, because in this case future replication of negotiations rests more on goodwill than agreed commitment (see Table 3). Interestingly enough, there are relatively clear links between the country of origin, the organizational form to institutionalize IFA-related consultation, the GUFs involved and the forms of monitoring. IFAs with TNCs headquartered in Germany usually recognize the EWC as the body of labour representation. IFAs with TNCs headquartered in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal) very often refer to the establishment of a special committee, whereas Scandinavian TNCs score relatively low on this scale; their IFAs are more likely to favour ad hoc or annual meetings. As far as the GUFs are concerned, the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) seems to prefer to relate IFAs organizationally to already established works council structures, whereas agreements in which the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) is involved have the weakest form of institutionalization by meetings. The agreements of the Union Network International (UNI) show a more flexible set of organizational arrangements.

Regarding the actor constellation on labour’s side, we interpret the results in Table 3 as indicating that the actor constellation at the time of initiation also has a strong influence on the future implementation by establishing different channels for conflict resolution. In this way, the channels of external influence on IHRM spill over into internal mechanisms for initiating an ongoing transfer of practices. Where GUFs need to use the EWC for establishing their influence, conflict resolution sticks to this body of internal conflict resolution. This is also the solution observed where coalitions on labour’s side have been applied to initiate the IFA. In contrast to that, in cases in which only external actors (GUFs and national/regional unions) have been involved, either weaker forms of initiating practice transfer or the definition of a special monitoring body are observed.

- INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE -

On the management side, we observe that where management favours a more holistic approach to CSR, i.e. one which incorporates IFAs, there is a preference for internally oriented conflict resolution mechanisms as well (see Table 4).
By itself, an analysis of organizational forms does not reveal much about the actual quality of consultation and information provided to employees by IFAs. Here, the issues defined for regular consultation and information seem to be more relevant. Using European legislation on EWCs as a standard, the following issues could have a priority for being included in IFAs: (1) employment and working conditions, (2) general business information, (3) organizational restructuring, and (4) mass dismissals. In half of all IFAs, none of these subjects are explicitly defined as a subject for consultation. This indicates how long the road might be toward establishing company-related international labour relations and IHRM practices on the same level as with EWCs. But in a third of our cases, more than one of these issues is specified for regular information and consultation. In particular, agreements in which ICEM is involved include consultation issues. In addition, involvement of the EWC seems to be rather beneficial for the inclusion of relevant consultation issues. The same holds true for the involvement of national unions. GUFs supported by national unions and EWCs seem to be more successful in including more issues on the IFA agenda. This could be regarded as a step toward establishing a new arena for international labour relations.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have extended the model of practice transfer developed by Szulanski (1996, 2000) in four respects in order to investigate how employment-related practice transfer within TNCs and in the context of their global production networks is initiated. First, while acknowledging the importance of hierarchical fiat in initiating (and disseminating) practices, we have opened the model with respect to employee voice as it might influence the initiation (and implementation) of labour-related practices. Second, we complemented this nevertheless still hierarchy-based concept of practice transfer by allowing for the possible involvement of subsidiaries in the initiating (and not only the implementation) of practices in the TNCs. Third, we acknowledge in the extended model that different forms of governance may be found in global production networks, even operating at the same time (plural form), where each form provides different conditions for the initiating of practice transfer in such networks. Finally, we extended the model by including GUFs and national unions as possible external actors in the initiating and implementing of labour practices in global production networks.
References


**Figure 1** Transfer of practices in global production networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of signatories on labour’s side</th>
<th>ILO core conventions</th>
<th>Additional ILO conventions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUF only</td>
<td>13 (65.0%)</td>
<td>7 (35.0%)</td>
<td>20 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUF and EWC</td>
<td>9 (100.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>9 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUF and national union</td>
<td>19 (63.3%)</td>
<td>11 (36.7%)</td>
<td>30 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUF, national union and EWC</td>
<td>13 (100.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>13 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 (75.0%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 (25.0%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>72 (100.0%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(3), 10.5778**

**Table 1** IFAs according to signatories and practices/standards
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor type</th>
<th>Function and domain of expertise</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>HRM/Sourcing/CSR</td>
<td>Evonik, Freudenberg, Rhodia, Leoni, BMW, Daimler, Lafarge, Hochtief, ISS, Deutsche Bank, BASF</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>GUFs/works councils/national unions at HQ</td>
<td>UNI, IMF, ICEM, BWI</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>CSOs, employer associations and country experts</td>
<td>International Organisation of Employers (IOE), World Economy, Ecology and Environment (WEED), etc.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2** Interviews conducted by September 2009

| Actor constellation                     | Organizational forms of monitoring |                      |          |      |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
|                                        | Meetings                          | EWC embodiment       | Special group | Total |
| GUF only                                | 14                                  | 6                    | 20        |
|                                         | 70.0%                              | 30.0%                | 100.0%    |
| GUF and EWC                             | -                                  | 9                    | 9         |
|                                         | -                                  | 100.0%               | 100.0%    |
| GUF and national/regional unions        | 11                                  | 6                    | 13        |
|                                         | 36.7%                              | 20.0%                | 43.3%     | 100.0% |
| GUF, national union and EWC             | 4                                   | 7                    | 2         |
|                                         | 30.8%                              | 53.9%                | 15.4%     | 100.0% |
| Total                                   | 29                                  | 22                   | 5         |
|                                         | 40.3%                              | 30.6%                | 29.2%     | 100.0% |

Pearson chi2(6) = 37.6587***

**Table 3** Organizational forms of monitoring by GUF

| Individual complaint procedure | Organizational forms of monitoring |                      |          |      |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
|                               | Meetings                          | EWC embodiment       | Special group | Total |
| No                             | 21                                  | 12                   | 18        | 51    |
|                                | 41.2%                              | 23.5%                | 35.3%     | 100.0% |
| Yes                            | 8                                   | 10                   | 3         | 21    |
|                                | 38.1%                              | 47.6%                | 14.3%     | 100.0% |
| Total                          | 29                                  | 22                   | 21        | 72    |
|                                | 40.3%                              | 30.6%                | 29.2%     | 100.0% |

Pearson chi2(2) = 5.1110*

**Table 4** Organizational forms of monitoring by individual complaint procedure