SPIRIT, AND BEING IN MANAGEMENT: A HEDIEGGERIAN REDESCRIPTION OF DRUCKER

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Abstract

This paper re-describes Drucker’s notion of “spirit” in terms of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The aim of doing so is to argue that management is more than set of techniques or tools, that it is a way of being-in-the-world and that research should focus on management less in terms of an ontology of objects and more on it as a way of being. It also aims to show the importance of philosophy for management, for Heideggerian hermeneutic philosophy looks at a phenomenon from within and not in terms of the ontological distinction between subject and object which underpins the sciences and social sciences. Thus the function of Heidegger’s philosophy is to provide a framework for enabling the practice of management to be explored from within. The essay also argues that looking at management as a way of being provides a framework within which to write about management as an integrated whole rather than a set of fragmented business functions.
Drucker sees what he calls “spirit” as essential to the exercising or even actualising of the function of management. Drucker claims that while management by objectives and the clarification of the role of a manager are necessary conditions for effective performance as managers, they are not sufficient conditions for effective performance. Without the dimension of spirit all of the above are reduced to detached routines, techniques and procedures that deprive organizations of the vitality necessary for performance:

“Management by objectives tells a manager what he ought to do. The proper organization of his job enables him to do it. But it is the spirit of the organization that determines whether he will do it. It is the spirit that motivates, that calls upon a man’s reserves of dedication and effort, that decides whether he will give his best or do just enough to get by.” (193: 144)

Extending Ducker’s position, in the same category we can locate any technique or skill of a manager such as negotiating skills, strategic planning or marketing skills. These skills need to be embodied in the “spirit” of a manager, thereby suggesting that the “spirit” of a manager is that in which the various skills, techniques and objectives are embodied and held together as a whole.

Historically little attention has been paid to the “spirit” of being a manager. According to Mintzberg, the dominant assumption about the central characteristic of management is analysis. (2004) Because of its emphasis on analysis, the notion of “spirit” is anathema to the discourse of management. The implication of this is that, if Drucker is correct, and “spirit” is an essential part of being a manager, then to marginalise it as nonsense in analytic terms is to preclude an understanding of a central dimension of management, a dimension which holds
all of the range of functions together in a cohesive whole. And, as many authors on management have noted, the search for an integrating dimension has eluded scholars of management.

Martin Heidegger maintains that if we preclude the language of ontology -- or in the language of Drucker, “spirit” --, then we will not be able to find a dimension that integrates the various functions of something into a whole. Heidegger made this point in the late 1920’s in relation to the fragmentation of the university: “The fields of the sciences lie far apart. … This disrupted multiplicity of disciplines is today only held together by the technical organisation of the Universities.” (1948; 326)

Mintzberg makes the same point in relationship to MBA forms of management education and management practice; they are series of functions that are not integrated into a whole. As much as different universities have sought a “capstone” subject to integrate the various functions of management, capstones have not provided a concept for integrating the MBA: “Management is not about marketing plus finance plus accounting and so forth.” (2004:33) Even so called “capstone” subjects “hardly accomplish such integration.” (2004:34)

Continuing his argument, Mintzberg maintains that management schools have attempted to use courses in what is called “strategic management” to integrate the whole but, as he points out, strategic management is about analysis rather than synthesis and when we are looking at an integrated whole, we are looking at synthesis rather than analysis: “The very label ‘Strategic Management’ implies that the management of strategy is something apart from management itself.”. (2004:35)
Heidegger’s point is particularly relevant to business and management schools. While they may want to produce integrated programs, they are nothing more than series of fragments thrown together. And they are nothing more than a series of fragments thrown together, from the Heideggerian perspective, because the Cartesian language of rationalist thought, the tradition that underpins thinking not only in management but in universities as a whole, breaks the world into subjects and objects without offering a framework within which the whole or the “between” or that “within” which subject and object are situated. Heidegger’s mission in his early work is to recover a language to think the “within” in which both subject and object are situated. Heidegger attempts to do this within raising of the question of the meaning of Being. And as we will see he raises the question of Being in the context of a particular being, the being of the human being which he calls “Da-sein.” Da-sein is translated as “being-there.” “Being-there” means that the being of the human being is such that it is neither subject nor object but always and already situated “within” a world. To think being is already and always to think world. The importance of the phrase “being-there” is that it precedes the Cartesian distinction between subject and object and is introduced by Heidegger as a “primordial” unity that contains any split between subject and object and is itself neither subject nor object. Heidegger uses the phrase “being-in-the-world” to express the irreducible relationship between being and world, a relationship in which being cannot be reduced to world and world cannot be reduced to being.

While Heidegger does not use the word “spirit” to speak about the being of Dasein, this does not prevent a reading of Drucker’s work of the spirit of the organisation in terms of Heidegger’s notion of ontology. This is what I plan to do in this work. While Drucker writes a paper called “The Spirit of the Organisation” in which he outlines the importance of spirit for performance in an organisation, at no point in time does he define the notion of spirit. Yet
he does speak about the notion of spirit in ways that can be understood ontologically in a
Heideggerian sense as spirit is not to be identified with any particular organisational activity
such as management by objectives, or any techniques of management but all of these
activities, as indicated in the quotation from Drucker above, are dependent upon an integrated
through the notion of spirit.

Just as it is the function of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world to integrate the whole,
so it is the function of “spirit” to integrate management as a practice as a whole and the
“spirit” of management could form the integrating framework for management education. Yet
we need to learn to speak the language of spirit again for it has been robbed of its richness
and vitality. The language of “spirit” goes beyond the traditional rationalist discourse in
which management has been situated. “Spirit” is not a thing or object that can be quantified
or measured. We need to go beyond the rationalist discourse in which management has been
situated in order to open up the language of spirit and its importance for management.

This is Heidegger’s project in relation to Being in BT, that is, to re-enchant it. It is the project
of this paper to apply Heidegger’s deconstruction of Cartesian rationality and reconstruction
of the importance of ontology to the field of management through the work of Drucker on
spirit. In this paper I want to demonstrate that Heidegger’s notion of the being of the human
being as Da-sein allows for going beyond the traditional rationalist language of management
and thus allows for a conceptualisation of a framework for what Drucker means by “spirit,”
that an elaboration of Heidegger’s notion of the being of da-sein will enable us to clarify what
Drucker believes to be the spiritual dimension and importance of management. In addition I
will show how Heidegger’s notion of authentic being in the world provides a basis upon
which to integrate the various functions of management into a cohesive whole.
The first section of the paper shall be an outline of some of the key themes in Heidegger’s notion of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The second section will be redescribing Drucker’s notion of spirit in terms of Heidegger’s notion of concern and the third section will be a conclusion outlining the integrative role that the Heideggerian notion of concern which underpins the way of being of being a manager can play in holding the field of management together as a whole.

AUTHENTIC AND INAUTHENTIC BEING IN HEIDEGGER

According to Heidegger, we have “forgotten” (1985:21) how to raise the question of Being – and for that matter the question of the being of spirit. They are terms that have been deprived of their existential and “concrete meaning.” (1985:49). At best the question of Being has become conceptual “material for reworking,” (1985:43). Similarly other existential philosophers such as Kierkegaard are disenchanted with the way in which the church has deprived the phenomenon of spirit of its lived vitality.

But what Heidegger wants to restore is a sense of the presence of Being such that Being is no longer an object of theoretical contemplation but is experienced with a sense of mystery and awe that he traces back to ancient Greek “philosophy.” His claim is that we have forgotten how to stand within the awesome nature of the question: why is there something rather than nothing: how come is “is”? Even if we do ask the question, it is as an abstract question rather than a way of questioning in which we find ourselves. Heidegger seeks to re-enchant this question such that we are in the question asking it with our whole being. For he believes that today, we have “forgotten” this question to the extent of not even seeing this as a trivial question (1985:22).
Yet, Heidegger argues that in our beings, we are, without having made it explicit, already asking the question of being. Heidegger wants to enable us to reconnect to and make explicit in Being and Time how we are already asking the question of Being. It is thus important to note that Heidegger in BT is not seeking to answer but to demonstrate how the human being in its very being is raising the question of being, a question that it covers over, has erased and forgotten — and to that extent has forgotten its own being, becoming preoccupied with subjects and objects. Because of the influence of Descartes, our language predisposes us to speak in terms of a distinction between subjects and objects whereas the world which we inhabit is neither a subject not an object. It does not stand outside of us as a thing or substance to be examined in the mode of a detached scientist and it is not within us in the mode of some kind of unconsciousness. We are “within” the world and so neither those modes of positivism which allow us to explore what is outside of us nor those practices within psychology or the social sciences which allow for exploration of subjectivity are appropriate to the exploration of the question of Being.

The question, for Heidegger is how to explore the “withiness” of Being that the human being as Dasein is. He aims in BT to raise this question through an exploration of the being of a particular being which he calls Da-sein, the human being. The reason to explore the question of Being through Dasein is that as “being-there” Da-sein is, as will become clear, prior to subjects and objects. Da-sein is neither subject nor object but a being within relationship to the world. To explore Being is to explore the way in which Dasein is already in relationship to the world. Heidegger believes that this is not possible in terms of a Cartesian epistemology and in fact even Plato and the ancient Greeks did not have a language to explore this “withinness.”
The question is: how to raise of the being of Da-sein or the human being. This is not, for Heidegger primarily a cognitive question. And even if it was, for Heidegger the conditions under which cognitive questions themselves are raised needs to be accounted for. For the human being in its “average everyday” lived experience of the world is not, primarily and for the most part a questioning being. It is a being preoccupied with the pragmatic task of building a home in the world. It is only under certain conditions that it becomes a questioning being. For Heidegger Da-sein becomes a questioning being when its being is thrown into question. The primary existential conditions under which its being are thrown into question is made manifest in what Heidegger calls the experience of anxiety. In anxiety, Heidegger maintains that Dasein comes “face to face” (1985:233) with itself as being-in-the-world, that is, in anxiety it becomes clear to Dasein that it is neither subject nor object but a being that is always and already in relationship to the world. Heidegger uses the words care, concern, and attunement to describe the experience of coming to see that Dasein is a way of being-in-the-world. For to be a being-in-the-world does not mean a physical proximity of one being to another as say tea may be “in” a tea cup. It means being-in or dwelling in concerns. Whether it likes it or not Dasein is always within some way of being concerned about the world. It is important to note that concern is neither internal nor external to Dasein but Dasein is always within a concern. To be in a world means to be in a set of concern. This is also what Dasein means: “being-there” means being in a set of concerns.

The experience of coming face to face with itself in anxiety is a traumatic experience of what Heidegger calls the “uncanniness” of being. It is a moment in which Da-sein experiences itself as having no ground upon which to stand. It has “no one” to turn to and “no-where” to
escape. It is also at a loss for words, having no language to describe the experience that it is.

Wittgenstein, in the little that he read of Heidegger, expresses this experience very well when he says: “I can readily think what Heidegger means by Being and Dread. Man has the impulse to run up against the limits of language. Think, for example, of the astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer to it. Everything which we feel like saying can, a priori, only be nonsense. Nevertheless, we do run up against the limits of language.”

Paradoxically then the question of being can never be posed as a question. For to have formulated in language is to already have escaped the uncanniness of being. However, this does not mean that dasein is not in question in the experience of dread or the uncanniness of being. Because of the dreadfulness of having no ground on which to stand and no language in which to unpack the experience of dread, the uncanniness of anxiety throws Dasein off balance: either to escape into the inauthenticity of everyday being or to resolutely “own” (Heidegger uses the word “eigentlichkeit”) the uncanniness of its way of being. Inauthenticity is a practice of getting lost in the busy-ness of everyday living and expresses itself as being disconnected – or what Heidegger calls “distantiality” (1985, p.164) -- and divorced from being present in situations. It expresses itself as a “tranquilized familiarity” in which Dasein’s attunement gets “dimmed down.” (1985, p.234) In this state “its onwmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it.” (1985, p.222) and it is “cut off” from an authentic presence towards others, the world and towards itself. (1985, p.214) What Dasein says and does in this state is not “grounded” in its own struggle to become (1985, p.212-213) but is based on what is passed on by others or by what Heidegger calls the “they” (1985, p.164). It produces a “levelling down” (1985, p.165) and an “averageness” (1985, p.164) which numbs Dasein’s attunement to the
world in which it is situated. This dumbing down is expressed by Heidegger as an “idle talk” which is a jargon based form of talking that “feeds upon superficial reading.” (1985, p212)

In contrast to inauthenticity is what Heidegger calls authenticity. He characterizes authenticity in several ways including the fact that in its authentic being in the world Dasein becomes aware that they way in which it has lived out its everyday interactions within the world is governed by a set of conventions or “average everyday” way of doing things that it has assumed as natural but are in fact handed down to it by tradition. In realizing that it does not see things as they are but in ways that have been shaped or governed by tradition Dasein is offered the opportunity to move from being mastered by to mastery of the tradition. Heidegger calls this transition from being mastered by to mastery of one’s way of being within the world “eigentlichkeit” which has been translated as “individualization” but can also be translated as ownership. Individualisation is an experience of owning and taking responsibility for the way in which Dasein is thrown into the world. Rather than blaming others or the “they” for its way of doing things, Dasein embraces the experience of being answerable for its way of being in the world. This does not create a sense of security or experience of being at ease for Dasein but what Martin Buber has called a “holy insecurity,” or Heidegger calls an “anticipatory resoluteness,” a sense that meaning is neither simply given or even settled but that Dasein is always at stake and in question in the meaning that it makes of its world. Heidegger expresses this in another way by saying that in anxiety Dasein comes to see its being as being-possible. This phrase can be grasped by contrasting it with the concreteness or busy-ness of actuality. While actuality or everydayness is one dimension, it is not the only dimension of being. Dasein is not for ever stuck in a particular way of being. It can always be more than and other than what it is at any given point in time. In its inauthentic way of being, Dasein likes to believe that the way it does things is the natural and irrefutable
way of doing things. It does not want to see that the way it does things is one amongst several possibilities. In its authentic mode of being, Dasein comes to understand that it always has several possibilities, that the tradition or nature or God is not responsible for the possibility that it chooses but that it is always answerable for the possibility that it chooses.

Living in the uncertainty of possibility, for Heidegger this means that Dasein needs to learn to live with a sense of what he calls “resolve.” Resolve is a paradoxical state of being answerable in the face of the uncertain and ungroundedness of possibility. It is characterised by trembling but being willing to embrace this trembling of being answerable for one’s own being.

Along with his general distinction between authentic and inauthentic responses to the anxiety of being, Heidegger makes a distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of relating to others. The basis of the distinction is to be found in the distinction between two phrases in Heidegger “leaping in” and “leaping ahead.” (158). “leaping in” is characterised by taking the “care” of the other away, by depriving them of ownership of their way of being, or as Heidegger puts it, the other is “thrown out of his position.” “Leaping in” is characterized by a relationship of domination and dependence. (158) “Leaping ahead,” on the other hand is about creating the conditions in which the care or concern of the other can express itself “authentically as such for the first time.” (159) It is a way of enabling the other to become free for his or her concern. Donald Winnicott, the British psychoanalyst, has a beautiful phrase for this notion of “leaping ahead.” He claims that a psychoanalyst needs to provide what he calls a “holding environment” in which a patient can feel safe enough to express their insecurities” such that they can begin to express their authentic concerns.
It is important to note that “leap in” and “leaping ahead” are forms of concern. And indeed in anxiety Dasein discovers itself as being who is attuned to the world. Heidegger calls Dasein at this point a creature of Care. It is care or concern that provides the logic in terms of which Dasein is seen as being-in-the-world such that neither being nor world are reducible to each other. It is also again worth pointing out that Dasein does not have care but is always and already within care.

Finally it is worth saying that the distinction between authentic and inauthentic being in Heidegger is neither an ethical nor a moral but an ontological distinction. It refers to the way in which Dasein opens and closes down possibilities for itself. Furthermore, Dasein does live for the most part in an inauthentic and average everyday way. This is central to its way of getting along in the world. It is for moments that it comes out of this inauthentic way of being into an authentic experience of itself as being possible.

DRUCKER’S NOTION OF SPIRIT IN THE CONTEXT OF HEDIEGGER’S NOTION OF AUTHENTIC CONCERN.

What has this description of authentic and inauthentic Dasein got to do with management? I will argue that Drucker’s notion of spirit which he sees as essential to management practice presupposes an “authentic” attunement to the world in the sense outlined by Heidegger and thus that Drucker’s notion of spirit which he does not define, can be defined in terms of Heidegger’s notion of authentic concern. This will suggest that while managers may need objectives, techniques and procedures in terms of which to manage, these are not sufficient
conditions for effective management. They need to be underpinned by authentic concern. It is authentic concern that is the integrative dimension of being a manager. This means that management is a way of being within the world. To discover the particular way of being within the world characteristic of management is to discover the whole within which all the parts are situated.

The importance of authentic concern for management can be seen in the way in which Drucker characterises the spiritual tasks of a manager. In Heideggerian terms Drucker writes both the manager as needing to “leap ahead” of those whom he or she is managing. Firstly he speaks about the role of management as being able to bring out the best in other people. (1993:151) In order to do this a manager needs to be able to focus on the abilities in others (1993) and a fundamental danger to an organisation is a manager who is attuned to highlighting the disabilities of others. (1993:145) He claims that nothing destroys an organisation more than focusing on people’s weaknesses. Part of the spirit of management is to actualise potential in people that they did not even know they had by enabling “common men to do uncommon things.” (1993:145)

In order for managers to enable effective or excellence in performance in their subordinate’s managers need to take responsibility for what Drucker calls the “appraisals” (1993:149) that managers form of their subordinates and they need to act on the appraisals that they form. As Drucker puts it: “Rather than being outsourced to psychological tests, appraisal should always be the direct responsibility of a man’s manager and should always focus on performance rather than personality.” (1993:149)
Outsourcing of making appraisals to psychologists or even executive coaches would be a form of inauthenticity. It would, in Heideggerian terms be a way of shifting responsibility by allowing the other as what Heidegger calls the “they” to make decisions for us. Ownership of our way of making appraisals presupposes in Heideggerian terms “resolve in the face of anxiety.” For we cannot rely on a tradition, on scientific instruments to justify our appraisals. We are the ground of our own way of making appraisals. Drucker maintains that psychological and personality tests are ways in which manager’s escape from the responsibility of needing to make appraisals of other people. Yet the “lived experience” of managers is such that they are constantly making appraisals of others. These appraisals can have almost ultimate consequences for employees as they are related to decisions around hiring, firing, career development and thus well being in general: “Day after day a manager makes decisions based on his appraisal of a man and his performance: in assigning work to him; in assigning people to work under him: in salary recommendations; in promotion recommendations etc.” (1993:155)

This also means that managers cannot rely on scientific means of appraising others nor can appraisal be reduced to scientific method. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, appraising others is based on the ways in which a manager relates to and experiences the subordinates – science is always about being at a distance from rather than in relation to others. Yet for Drucker and for Heidegger management is a way of “being-with” and involved in others rather than an objective standing at a distance from the other. Secondly forming appraisals is, according to Drucker based on values and standards (1993:150) of the manager and not the supposed neutrality of a disinterested scientist. Managers come to know their subordinates by being in relationship to them. The very relationship itself affects the performance and
development of the subordinates. Of course for Heidegger management is always and already a way of relating to the other.

Because the basis of effective performance is appraisal and because appraisal presupposes judgement, values and standards, the “spirit” of management is essentially a values based activity. Rather than trying to eliminate value judgements from management by hoping for the naive idea of a neutral and detached scientific manager, managers need to develop an awareness of values and the way in which they impact on performance. Without even being explicitly aware of it, managers do, according to Drucker, rely on their “intuitive” appraisals or judgments of others. However, for Drucker relying on intuitive judgment is blind and thus dangerous for bringing out the best in others and thus being a manager: “Without a systematic approach to appraisal, the manager has nothing but hunch and the employee is left at the mercy of management hunches.” (1993:149)

From a Heideggerian perspective intuitions are always formed on the basis of judgments. If we simply make intuitive appraisals without an understanding of the pre-judgments in terms of which these intuitive appraisals are made, then we become governed by rather than masters of the way in which we make judgments. The transition from inauthentic to authentic being is a process of moving from being governed by an intuitive set of judgments to understanding and owning the terms in which we make judgments.

In addition, what gets in the way of good judgment are negative emotions such as envy, greed or a sense of being threatened by the excellence in performance of others (1993:158,153) As Drucker says: “The man who always knows what people cannot do, but never sees anything they can, will undermine the spirit of the organisation.” (1993:157) When we see others
through the eyes of envy, resentment, or even, as Drucker says cynicism (1993:157) we want as Nietzsche and Freud amongst others, have indicated to pull them down rather than develop them. This is something anathema to Drucker’s notion of the managerial spirit which is about bringing out the best in others.

While not arguing that effective managers are by nature free of such negative emotions, they need to be able to put these emotions into perspective. The implication of this is that managers need to be willing to struggle with rather than dismiss the significance of emotions in forming judgments. For Heidegger it is in the way we respond to anxiety that allows us to either succumb to envy, resentment or greed on the one hand and on the other hand to be able to “leap ahead” and provide a space for others to perform rather than “leap into” controlling others and inhibiting the performance of others. Crucial to this experience for Heidegger is the notion of resolve, the willingness to embrace our powerlessness in the face of anxiety.

So a central question is: how do managers develop their practices of appraisal? In his article on the spirit of the organisation, Drucker gives us a clue: he says that a manager needs to “spell out” (1993:149) for himself and for his subordinates the values and assumptions in terms of which he or she forms judgments and appraisals. These values and assumptions are not clear and self evident to a manager themselves but require self examination. Drucker writes about the way in which the “self examination of the manager’s own and of his superior’s practice always leads to improvement.” (1993:157) It is in this way – by reflecting on practice -- that the values and judgments underpinning appraisals become, to use Drucker’s language, “spelt out” as the basis for decision making.
From the Heideggerian perspective it is important to add that such reflection is not a disengaged rational process but is dependent on the way in which we embrace anxiety. Anxiety is key because anxiety estranges us from our everyday practices in ways such that we come to see our practices. And it is only by seeing our way of doing things that we can get to reflect on and question our ways of making appraisals. Although not in the context of management, an experience of Nelson Mandela’s leadership practice is illustrative of the experience of reflection through estrangement: “We put down briefly in Khartoum, where we changed to an Ethiopian Airways flight to Addis. Here I experienced a rather strange sensation. As I was boarding the plane I saw that the pilot was black. I had never seen a black pilot before, and the instant I did I had to quell my panic. How could a black man fly a plane? But a moment later I caught myself: I had fallen into the apartheid mind-set, thinking Africans were inferior and that flying was a white man's job. I sat back in my seat, and chided myself for such thoughts.” (Mandela, 1995, p281)

In the context of the philosophical process what Mandela is saying is that he had a certain experience or perception of black men being unable to fly. However, instead of simply taking this belief for granted, he stood back from it and questioned it. The basis upon which he came to stand back and question it was a moment of disruption, or, as he puts it, an experience of a “strange sensation.” This strange sensation was the disruptive mood which allowed him to question and then to free himself from his assumption. Without the experience of the “strange sensation” it is doubtful that he would have questioned the convention of black men being unable to fly. The strange sensation was the mood that alerted him to his own dis-ease. Perhaps what is crucial in the case of Mandela is that he was highly attuned to the disruption, to the moment of a “strange sensation.” And because he was attuned to it, he was able to ask the question that was begging him to ask.
It is important to emphasise the relationship between questioning and the mood of a “strange sensation.” Mandela questioned his assumption because he experienced a “sensation” that invited him to question the assumption. Without this sensation of strangeness he would not have even noticed that there was a question to be asked. Rather he would not have even known that he had a prejudice. For by definition we do not simply notice our blind spots: we cannot even make an effort to see what we are blind to, for we do not know that we are blind to it. We need to be alerted to our blind spots. One way of being alerted is through the experience of strange sensations.

From the Heideggerian perspective, it is reflection through estrangement that is central to authentic being as a manager or leader.

One the dimensions that Drucker does not consider is the notion of time in management. It is a theme developed by Mintzberg in detail but because of space I will not pick it up at this point.

Conclusion:

The task of building the spirit of managers and the organisation is not a technical task but one that is existentially challenging and demanding. It requires being-in a set of concerns. I hope to have shown that Drucker believes that underpinning all the technical dimensions of management is the notion that a manager needs to be concerned or attuned to the world in
which he or she is situated. It is not enough to have the technical competences required for
management such as setting of tasks or objectives. These need to be underpinned by authentic
concern. “Concern” has a very central place in Heidegger’s philosophy. It is definitive of the
human beings way of being within the world. “Concern” for Heidegger is not something that
we have but something we are always and already in. However concern can be lived out
either authentically or inauthentically. When we do management by numbers, technique or
just functions, we are living it out inauthentically. To live management out authentically is to
embrace and own the way in which we appraise the world, it is to “leap ahead” of rather than
“leap into” others and it is to “be-there,” that is present in our role as managers. To
understand management as a way of being concerned is to understand management as a way
of being that each and every individual manager is “within.” When we begin to be able to
understand management as a particular way of being concerned about the world, we will
begin to be able to develop an integrative notion of management as a way of being within the
world. Management as a way of being within the world is a way of articulating Drucker’s
notion of the spiritual dimension of management.

However, I fear that the notion of concern is not a weighty enough word for those still
dominated by a Cartesian mindset. As Heidegger says, we are still stuck between
disappearance of the old gods of Cartesian rationalism and the not yet of the new gods. The
point is to be able to dance and play in the space of the disruption of the old and the not yet of
the new.

References


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