

Shame: A Review and Research Model

Dr. Steven A. Murphy

Sprott School of Business, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Email: steven_murphy@carleton.ca

Dr. Sandra Kiffin-Peterson

Business School, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia

Email: sandra.kiffin-petersen@uwa.edu.au

ABSTRACT

In this paper we review the shame literature and its historical roots in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the path forward for organizational scholars focusing on this complex 'moral' emotion. A model based on Affective Events Theory is developed to describe how shame may manifest itself in employees. We propose a holistic treatment of shame that includes dispositional and organizational influences on the cognitive and emotional forces that work to shape felt shame. The implications of our review for concrete research action and organizational life are discussed.

Keywords: Emotions, Interpersonal Behaviour, Managerial Thinking and Cognition, Values.

INTRODUCTION

The more things a man is ashamed of, the more respectable he is.

George Bernard Shaw

During the past fifteen years, organizational scholars have devoted considerable research attention to studying specific emotions in a work environment (e.g. anger, Geddes & Callister 2007). Despite recent advances, continued progress in understanding emotions in worklife depends on a better understanding of the structure of affective processes, especially with respect to complex emotions, such as shame. Shame is both a moral and a social emotion. Sensitivity to shame is learned early in life and internalized so that violating social norms can arouse feelings of shame. Shame can arise from the deeply held fear of being found defective or judged as not meeting some unknown ideal in society or organizations. Shweder (2003: 1115) puts it well in saying:

...one is aware that one might be seen to have come up short in relationship to some shared and uncontested ideal that defines what it means to be a good, worthy, admirable, attractive, or competent person, given one's status or position in society.

Shame has long been recognized as crucially important to human functioning, in a variety of academic disciplines, yet most references to this emotion continue to be general, vague and lacking in depth of knowledge. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of organizations, where there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical research about shame. In the field of organizational behaviour, where we have seen a surge in emotions research, we still have not addressed fundamental issues around how and why people feel 'good enough' and whether they believe themselves to 'fit in' with the social work groups. In this paper we aim to bridge this void in the literature by providing a

comprehensive review of other literatures, and presenting a model of how shame may be activated in work environments.

Some theorists have posited that shame is taboo in western cultures such that people usually feel ashamed about shame, and one risks offence by referring to shame (Kaufman & Raphael 1984). 'The taboo on shame is so strict... that we behave as if shame does not exist' (Kaufman 1989: 3-4). Further, shame is not only taboo it is also so pervasive in society as to warrant deeper examination in various aspects of our daily functioning, including work. Similarly, at work it may not be wise to openly discuss how one might feel like an imposter, and feelings of self-doubt are not usually associated with upward mobility.

Shame has individual, managerial, and social functions. At an individual level, the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation (Baumeister & Leary 2000). Managers may also use shame to manipulate others, encourage competition and suppress dysfunctional behaviours. The primary social function of shame is its effect on regulating behaviour in line with social norms. This often means conforming to the status quo or the behavioural standards that are set by the dominant groups within a society.

Some influential pioneers (cf. Lewis 1971, Tomkins 1962, 1963) argued that shame is the premier or meta-emotion because of its prominent role in our daily lives (even if at a subconscious level). That is, because the self is social, shame may serve to organize society and align members with values and social norms in a fashion that no other emotion can lay claim.

This paper first defines shame and differentiates it from guilt, while explaining what it means to be a moral emotion. This initial review of decades of shame research in psychology and sociology leads to an initial theoretical framework (Figure 1) that depicts the influences of cognition and affect that underlie shame. From here, the limited but valuable organizational research on shame is presented. While shame has not been the specific focus of inquiry in organizational research to date, there are many lessons from organizational research that included the concept of shame in various contexts. The potential responses to shame are then discussed in order to understand how shame may indeed "play out" in organizational settings. Finally, affective events theory is utilized in the creation

of a process model for shame in organizations (Figure 2). The paper concludes with four salient avenues for future organizational shame research based on the lessons learned herein.

Definition of Shame

Kaufman (1989: 18) provided a definition of shame that captures some of the words complex meaning: ‘Sudden, unexpected exposure coupled with blinding inner scrutiny.’ The evocativeness of this short phrase seems appropriate to the experiential reality of this complex emotion. As a self-conscious emotion, shame requires an object (one is always ashamed of something) that involves direct and meaningful threats to the self. Psychoanalytically, shame can be viewed as a response to failure and shortcomings of the self. Typical expressive behaviours include a blushing face, downcast eyes and turning away. According to Kaufman (1989) the breaking of the interpersonal bond is the activator of shame. This breaking can occur when one fails to ‘fully hear, openly validate, and understand another’s need by directly communicating its validity’ (Kaufman 1989: 34). It is not hard to think of the numerous possibilities at work where an employee looks to be validated by a manager, or colleague. The extent to which fully hearing, openly validating, and understanding the needs of employees might actually lead to feelings of psychological safety and foster creativity and other positive states is yet to be uncovered (see Newton, Khanna & Thompson 2008). That is, avoiding shame may have individual and organizational utility beyond feeling good.

Most authors (e.g., Goffman 1967; Lewis 1971; Piers & Singer 1953; Schneider 1977) point out the confusion between constructs such as shame and guilt. Schneider (1977) provides valuable insights into the phenomenological worlds of shame and guilt by associating shame with embarrassment, humiliation, pride, mortification, disgrace, ridicule, dishonour and honour, weakness and strength, and narcissism. Guilt, he associates with debt, transgression, injury, duty, obligation, offence, wrong, and obsessive/compulsive. While shame needs an object (one is always ashamed of something), and involves direct and meaningful threats to the self, in contrast, guilt needs no object, is more ideational and is about an act. In terms of psychoanalytic distinctions, shame can be viewed as a response to failure and shortcomings of the self in relation to loss of love, while guilt is seen as a response to transgression and thereby related to the psychology of conscience and to the threat of

punishment. From examining the above descriptions and comparisons one might rightly wonder why there has been such vagueness about the nature of shame and such confusion as to its relation to guilt. The two phenomena appear to be structurally, dynamically, functionally, and experientially unique.

To partially answer the question of the vagueness of shame and its confusion with guilt, we need to examine psychoanalytic theory. Broadly speaking, prior to Nathanson (1987) and with the sole exception of Tomkins' work (1962, 1963) guilt was the primary focus of Freudian psychoanalytic theory while shame received very little attention. That is not to say that shame was entirely absent, as Adler (1933) and Horney (1950) identified some of the effects of shame. Similarly, Piers and Singer (1953) conceptualized shame as arising from tension between the ego and ego ideal, while guilt was seen as arising from tension between the ego and superego. Erikson (1950) placed shame in the second of his eight stages of identity development. Lynd (1958) furthered the work of Erickson and conceived shame to be deeply embedded in the individual's search for identity. However, with very few exceptions psychoanalytic theorists concentrated on drivers rather than affects and conceived of shame in terms of Freudian theory. A notable exception was the work of Lewis (1971) who made the major contribution of the clinical identification of and distinction between shame and guilt, as well as the demonstration of unacknowledged shame.

A new direction was established in psychoanalytic writing on shame by Nathanson (1987), who brought together in one book, a variety of theoretical, clinical, and research orientations including Lewis (1987) and Tomkins (1987). The break from Freudian theory, and the incorporation of both controlled clinical observation and neurologically based cognitive theory established Nathanson's (1987) contribution as both highly integrative and broadly general. This prepared the way for two major attempts at integrative and comprehensive treatments of shame by Kaufman (1989) and Nathanson (1992). Nathanson (1992: 59) regards shame as a 'pattern of expression, a specific package of information triggered in response to a particular type of stimulus.' He calls Tomkins' (1963) idea that 'the function of any affect is to amplify the highly specific stimulus that sets it in motion' the 'most important' and 'most central idea' of his own book (Nathanson 1992: 59). As he points out, one can appreciate why this would be so if one remembers how common it is to think of emotion as an interrupter of intellectual function. Expanding on Tomkins' (1963) theory of shame as

affect, Kaufman (1989: 30) asserts, 'each affect has both innate and learned activators' that can help us differentiate the amount and degree of shame experienced. It is important to remember both the biological and socialized (learned) aspects of shame and the latter has often been stressed in the social psychological literature at the expense of the former. If Organizational Behaviour scholars hope to gain any ground with shame, we must become more serious about neurobiological markers of affect and how they interact with work stimuli.

Shame is part of a group of moral emotions that are believed to help with socialization and discourage unethical behaviour (for reviews, see Eisenberg 2000; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007). Guilt, embarrassment and shame, which comprise the three basic negatively valenced self-conscious emotions, provide the energy and motivation to do good things or to avoid being bad (Tangney et al. 2007). Embarrassment and shame differ in their intensity, with the former being less intense than shame. Guilt can also be differentiated from shame in that the former also involves feelings of remorse for what has been done or not done. The self-conscious moral emotions can exert a strong effect on behaviour by providing feedback on both anticipatory behaviour (anticipatory shame) as well as actual behaviour (consequential shame). As such, these emotions are important to understand why individuals adhere, or fail to adhere, to certain moral standards.

Some individuals have a greater propensity to experience emotions such as shame and guilt across a range of situations (Tangney 1990). Differences exist in dispositional tendencies to experience self-conscious emotions, such as shame. Shame-prone individuals are likely to experience both anticipatory and consequential shame in response to failure or transgressions in organizations. Differences between guilt proneness and shame proneness suggest that the former is associated with feeling bad about your behaviour, whereas the latter reflects feeling bad about self and is associated with wanting to hide or avoid the situation.

Distilling the lessons from decades of shame research in foundational disciplines to management provides an understanding that what happens in one's mind is inextricably linked to social context. Figure 1 presents a theoretical framework of cognitions and affect underlying felt shame. Felt shame is important to distinguish from shame that is repressed, as we know little in applied settings around the implications and dissonance created from repressed shame. What the

figure does help illuminate is that cognitive and emotional processes work in tandem with personality attributes and social contexts to help people make attributions about why they are experiencing shame. These attributions are critical as the “shame spiral” can involve initial feelings of shame leading to deep feelings of self-doubt and even worthlessness. The point being that the eventual attribution is highly predicated on the dance between how personality and social context combine to create an experience of shame unique to any one individual at any one point in time. With that understanding and backdrop, we can explore the limited but valuable contributions toward understanding shame from organizational research.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH AND SHAME

The primary social function of shame is its effect on the social bonds between members of an organization. This bond acts as a form of governance, serving as a check-and-balance to ensure that prescribed attitudes and behaviour align with societal norms and organizational values. In other words, acting outside of social norms may induce shame and serve to suppress non-conformity. We know that deviations from social norms can lead to experiences of shame (Goffman 1967). How employees navigate through social norms each day in relation to felt shame or the avoidance of shame is an important topic of study in organizational behaviour. Some degree of self-doubt is considered healthy, yet we know very little about how and why people question their own abilities and worth, and even less about why others belittle organizational members. And yet the opportunity cost of shame may be high. It is also crucial for applied shame research to identify what benefits may accrue from shame, because shame has important adaptive functions (e.g., helping to learn social norms, and impetus for much learning) that can easily be overlooked by those who choose to see only the potentially destructive sides of shame.

Prior Organizational Research

Self-regulation of shame and its effect on performance has been investigated in two studies of the salesperson-customer interaction (i.e. Bagozzi, Verbeke & Gavino 2003; Verbeke & Bagozzi 2002). Results from Verbeke and Bagozzi’s study of financial services showed that when salespeople

experienced shame they reportedly reacted with avoidance behaviors when they realized they were unacceptable, for whatever reason, to the customer. This in turn, negatively affected their sales performance, and ultimately the quality of their customer interaction. In another study of the salesperson-customer relationship, Bagozzi et al. (2003) found significant differences in how Dutch and Filipino salespeople responded to their felt shame, and hence, in how shame affected performance. For the Dutch salespeople, felt shame lead to protective behaviours that negatively impacted on performance and lead to poorer relations with customers. In contrast, the Filipino salespeople reacted to their shame by trying to repair the damage that had been done to their customer relationship and as a result, their performance was unaffected by the shame incident. These two studies suggest that how employees respond to shame may have an influence on their subsequent performance in situations where interpersonal relationships or teamwork are integral to job performance. The Dutch and Filipino study also point to the importance of culture in shame research. Bagozzi et al. found culture moderates the self-regulation of shame (with cultures valuing 'face' being more likely to be motivated into reparative actions).

Shame has also been theorized to be an important emotion in decision making when the person strongly identifies with their immediate work group or the organization (Ashforth & Mael 1989). Maitlis and Ozcelik (2004) conducted a qualitative study of musicians in an orchestra and found that musicians who were told their performance was unsatisfactory reacted with feelings of shame and humiliation. Questioning the musician's performing ability elicited intense negative emotions because it threatened their professional identity and their prospects for future employment. These emotions, in turn, eventually lead them to withdraw from the organization. This occurred, despite focusing on the musician's behaviour rather than themselves as individuals. Maitlis and Ozcelik found that actions to address unsatisfactory performance elicit feelings of shame in the target, as well as strong emotions in others who identify with the individual.

Over time, members of a work group develop a sense of group identity about how they see themselves and a belief in their mutual fate. Members' identification with the group also creates a fear of the disapproval of other group members for failing to live up to expectations. Betraying one's work group or failing to contribute adequately to the group's goal can elicit feelings of shame and

worthlessness. Vince (2006) found that managers experienced feelings of shame when a major initiative failed and the organization was subsequently taken over by another company. In another study of failure in organizations, Hareli, Shomrat and Biger (2005) investigated whether shame and guilt influenced employee's choice of explanations (e.g. denial, excuse, apology, compensation, justification) for their personal failures. When employees experienced either shame or guilt over damage they had caused their organization, they were more likely to offer some kind of compensation or to apologize for their wrongdoing. However, when the influence of guilt was controlled for, shame no longer had an influence on employee's explanations. Hareli et al. speculated that shame may have a greater impact when the failure is unknown to others and the employee must decide whether to disclose the incident and their possible role in it. Shame prone individuals may also respond more intensely to incidents of personal failure (Tangney 1990).

Responses to Shame in the Workplace

Shame can be a destructive emotion because it can lead to attacks on others, attacks on oneself, avoidance or withdrawal. Much damage can accrue to organizations and society if the person enters a shame-rage spiral as a consequence of failing to adequately address the initial incident (Scheff & Retzinger 2000). The theory of 'unacknowledged shame' from the legal literature (Braithwaite, 2002) suggests that shame that is not constructively dealt with, such as through conferencing before trial, may lead to displaced rage directed at the arbiters perceived responsible for the standards that the person has failed to adhere to. Avoiding or withdrawing from the source of the shame is also a common response to shame. For example, Edwards and Jabs (2009) found from their focus group interviews with research and development employees that an overemphasis on individual responsibility for safety can lead to feelings of shame when a person is injured and hence, a reluctance to report the injury. Trying to hide their injury was seen as one possible way, albeit a counterproductive one, of avoiding the anticipated shame of failing to meet the safety standards of the workgroup.

The exit, voice, loyalty and neglect (EVLN) model has been discussed in reference to responding to organisational decline, with voice and loyalty considered to be constructive responses,

and exit and neglect destructive responses (Farrell 1983). However, since shame is a moral emotion, 'voicing your shame' may increase the intensity of that shame once others in the organization become aware of your transgression or failure to meet expectations. Unless there are assurances otherwise, the fear of experiencing further shame may act as a disincentive for employees to use voice, and they may turn to other responses such as neglect or exiting the organization. Hareli et al. (2005) suggested that organizations need to create a climate where employees who experience shame and guilt in response to failure are encouraged to accept responsibility for their actions. Such an outcome however, is unlikely to occur if fear is the predominant emotion within the workplace culture. A process is needed in organizations to deal with shame that arises as with other emotions when employees may 'voice' their feelings about a situation.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: THE ROAD AHEAD

Given the paucity of research on shame in organizations there is widespread scope for studies in this area. The applied psychology literature has been strongly influenced by the affective events theory (AET) of Weiss and Cropanzano (1996). AET posits that both work events and individual dispositions contribute to affective states that subsequently lead to the formation of work attitudes. While AET has been applied piecemeal in subsequent organizational research (see Mignonac & Herrbach 2004), one of the theories major deficiencies is in assuming that all emotions interact with work and dispositional variables in roughly the same fashion. Nevertheless, several studies have approached the study of shame from the theoretical perspective of AET. Within an AET framework, certain events within organizations may trigger shame for individuals. For example, organizational events such as redundancies and mergers have been investigated as potentially shame-inducing events (Vickers & Parris 2007; Vince 2006). Since deviations from social norms can lead to the experience of shame (cf. Goffman 1967), change processes that threaten the culture of the organization may also constitute significant events that lead to experienced shame.

We believe that a more flexible application of AET towards the study of organizational shame could reap tremendous benefits. We propose such an affective events model of the shame process in organizations, in Figure 2. In our model, specific dispositional influences interact with specific work

environment attributes (building off the logic proposed in Figure 1) to create a potentially shame-inducing event. Whether this event will actually lead to felt shame is predicated by a number of factors. The first of which are dispositional influences. While genetic influences have been examined (see Tangney et al. 2007), dispositional traits have not been fully explored in relation to shame states, affect-congruent cognition, attitudes and behaviour. Dispositional influences on individual reactions of shame include shame-proneness (Tangney 1990), but may also include the core self-evaluations personality factors of generalized self-efficacy, self-esteem, internal locus of control and neuroticism (Judge, Erez, Bono & Thoresen 2003). Individual differences in generalized self-efficacy and self-esteem may also affect the level of shame that is experienced, because these factors influence the extent to which people attribute their failures to internal versus external causes (Newton et al. 2008).

Working in parallel with dispositional influences are organizational context factors that deal with socialized norms for behaviour. For instance, groups norms, the degree of psychological safety in the work environment, group cohesion and social identity are likely to influence the strength through which an employee feels bonded to the organization or sub-group, and thus how much of their social identity is susceptible to being shamed. Whether these factors actually lead to affective and cognitive turmoil over shame is likely highly predicated by whether the event is a public act, known to individuals considered 'important' in the employee's life (and thus, the addition of a moderating variable in the model).

Felt shame is dependent upon cognitive and affective processes. More specifically, where an individual cognitively questions their own ability or effort leading to a decreased self-concept, felt shame is more likely to be experienced. We know from the psychological literature that the immediate consequences of felt shame are likely to include attacking self and others, withdrawing and avoiding. In an organization, it seems a logical extension to think of such an individual decreasing their citizenship behaviour (as they withdraw), being absent more frequently, developing negative work attitudes and acting out through exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. Future research could test these dynamics *in situ*.

There appear to be at least four major avenues for inquiry that could provide insight into how shame-inducing events might be minimised in organizations. The first line of inquiry could focus on

understanding the events that induce shame in individuals. In applied settings, Affective Events Theory offers potential as an underlying theoretical framework to better understand the nature of events that induce shame at the individual level. Prior research also suggests a need to consider both intrapersonal (e.g. shame proneness) and interpersonal regulation of shame reactions in studies in organizational settings. Although it is acknowledged that investigating episodes of shame within organization won't be easy, given the taboo of shame that currently pervades society. Applied studies of shame in organizations examining critical incidents (Weiss & Cropanzano 1996), based on an Experience Sampling Methodology design could be used to examine shame within and between persons. The findings could be potentially triangulated with qualitative data to develop a richer understanding of the organizational context.

The second line of inquiry should focus on understanding how shame manifests in individual behaviour in organisations. Although laboratory studies of induced shame in students have proved helpful in the past for identifying how shame manifests itself (emotive and cognitive strategies) in a highly valenced scenario, the generalizability of such research to organizational settings is limited. More applicable scenarios relevant to organizational settings would need to be developed in order to increase the validity of this line of research. In particular, the effect of shame on performance in organizations has received little attention. Given that shame is a social emotion, further research is therefore needed into the effects of shame on both individual and group performance.

The third major line of inquiry that could be fruitful is in examining shame at the collective level, such as in work teams or at the level of the organization itself. The prevalence of various types of teams in organisations suggests that the use of shame may be a silent form of control that may operate, with both positive and negative consequences. The 'concertive control' observed by Barker (1993) in self-managing teams presumably relied on the inducement of shame in a team member when they failed to comply with the normative rules developed by the team. It would also be interesting to examine shame at the organizational level. Indeed, Poulson (2000) mentions the use of shaming as a means to reduce the incidence of harassment, rather than directly trying to understand its causes and origins. Recent examples of shameful organizational actions and their cover-up, such as the BP oil spill, may be helpful in understanding the phenomenon at this level. Studies of organizational

apologies that involve coding of publicly available footage could be insightful here. This methodological approach is non-intrusive, yet due to the linguistic richness of shame, potentially rewarding.

Finally, there are also obvious implications for the role of shame in relations between leaders and their followers. Despite a growing body of literature on the phenomenological experience and outward expressions of shame, far less is understood about how this complex emotion is related to seemingly similar psychological constructs. Authenticity, for example, has captured the attention of prominent philosophers and psychologists (much like shame), and is linked to 'becoming that self which one truly is' (Kierkegaard, 1849/1949: 29). That is, authenticity has been described as 'acting in accordance with one's true self' (Fleeson & Wilt 2010: 1354). In fact, it is deemed a basic value to act in accordance with one's own character (Ryan & Deci 2004). While shame is the product of a negative self-evaluation of self, and authenticity can be considered acting in accord with one's true self, these two psychological constructs have not been theoretically linked or empirically examined.

CONCLUSION

Shame needs to be respected by organizational researchers because of its complexity, but advances will only come if we use developments in social psychology in novel ways. Much of the confusion around shame can still be to its lack of conceptual clarity and its taboo status. We offer an organizational perspective on the history of shame research and provide a model based on Affective Events Theory. Shame is pervasive in most cultures, and simply because it is often difficult to discuss or acknowledge cannot be a reason we continue to fail to fully acknowledge its presence and role in organizations. Future research must wade through a mind field of psychological resistance, but advances can and will be made by returning to first principles and asking how and why shame 'plays out' as it does in organizations. By uncovering the likely universality of the 'imposter syndrome' and other shame-based worries and fears, we may be able to allow working people to feel more human in their self-questioning.

References

- Adler A (1933) *Der Sinn des Lebens*, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt aM, 1990.
- Ashforth BE & Mael F (1989) Social identity theory and the organization, *Academy of Management Review*, 14: 20-39.
- Bagozzi RP, Verbeke W & Gavino JC (2003) Culture moderates the self-regulation of shame and its effects on performance: The case of salespersons in the Netherlands and Philippines, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88: 219-233.
- Barker JR (1993) Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38: 408-437.
- Baumeister RF & Leary MR (1995) The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, *Psychological Bulletin*, 117: 497-529.
- Braithwaite J (2002) *Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Edwards M & Jabs LB (2009) When safety culture backfires: Unintended consequences of half-shared governance in a high tech workplace, *The Social Sciences Journal*, 46: 707-723.
- Eisenberg N (2000) Emotion, regulation, and moral development, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51: 665-697.
- Erikson E (1950) *Childhood and Society*, Norton, New York.
- Farrell D (1983) Exit, voice, loyalty and neglect as responses to declining job satisfaction: A multidimensional scaling study, *Academy of Management Journal*, 26: 596-607.
- Fleeson W & Wilt J (2010) The relevance of big five trait content in behavior to subjective authenticity: Do high levels of within-person behavioral variability undermine or enable authenticity achievement?, *Journal of Personality*, 78(4): 1353-1382.
- Geddes D & Callister RR (2007) Crossing the line(s): A dual threshold model of anger in organizations, *Academy of Management Review*, 32: 721-746.
- Goffman E (1967) *Interaction Ritual*, Anchor, New York.
- Hareli S, Shomrat N, & Biger N (2005) The role of emotions in employees' explanations for failure in the workplace, *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 20: 663-680.

- Horney K (1950) *Neurosis and Human Growth*, Norton, New York.
- Judge TA, Erez A, Bono JE & Thoresen CJ (2003) The core self-evaluations scale: Development of a measure, *Personnel Psychology*, 56: 303-331.
- Kaufman G (1989) *The Psychology of Shame*, Springer, New York.
- Kaufman G & Raphael L (1984) Shame as taboo in American culture, in Browne R (Ed) *Forbidden Fruits: Taboos and Tabooism in Culture*, 57-64, Bowling Green State University Press, Bowling Green, Ohio.
- Kierkegaard S (1941) *The Sickness Unto Death*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (Original work published 1849).
- Lewis HB (1971) *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, International Universities Press, New York.
- Lewis, HB (1987) *The Role of Shame in Symptom Formation*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.
- Lynd H (1958) *On Shame and the Search for Identity*. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London.
- Maitlis S & Ozcelik H (2004) Toxic decision processes: A study of emotion and organizational decision making, *Organization Science*, 15: 375-393.
- Mignonac K & Herbach O (2004) Linking work events, affective states, and attitudes: An empirical study of managers' emotions, *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 19(2): 221-240.
- Nathanson DL (1992) *Shame and pride: Affect, sex, and the birth of the self*, Norton, New York.
- Nathanson DL (1987) *The Many Faces of Shame*, The Guilford Press, New York.
- Newton NA, Khanna C & Thompson J (2008) Workplace failure: Mastering the last taboo, *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research*, 3: 227-245.
- Piers G and Singer MB (1953) *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study*, Norton, New York.
- Poulson CF II (2000) Shame and work, in Ashkanasy NM, Zerbe WJ, and Hartel CEJ (Eds) *Emotions in the Workplace: Research Theory and Practice*, 490-541, Quorum Books, Westport, CT.
- Ryan RM and Deci EL (2004) Autonomy is no illusion: Self-determination theory and the empirical study of authenticity, awareness, and will, in Greenberg J, Koole SL and Pyszczynski T (Eds) *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, 449-479, Guilford Press, New York.

- Scheff TJ (2003) Shame in self and society, *Symbolic Interaction*, 26(2): 239-262.
- Scheff TJ & Retzinger S (2000) Shame as the master emotion of everyday life, *Journal of Mundane Behavior*, 1: 303-324.
- Schneider C (1977) *Shame, Exposure, and Privacy*, Beacon, Boston.
- Shweder RA (2003) Toward a deep cultural psychology of shame, *Social Research*, 70: 1109-1130.
- Tangney JP (1990) Assessing individual differences in proneness to shame and guilt: development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59: 102-111.
- Tangney JP, Stuewig J & Mashek DJ (2007) Moral emotions and moral behaviour, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58: 345-372.
- Tomkins SS (1962) *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Positive Affect*, Vol 1, Springer, New York.
- Tomkins SS (1963) *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Negative Affect*, Vol 2, Springer, New York.
- Tomkins, S.S. (1987). Script theory, in Aronoff J, Rabin AI and Zucker RA (Eds) *The Emergence of Personality*, Springer, New York.
- Verbeke W & Bagozzi RP (2002) A situational analysis on how salespeople experience and cope with shame and embarrassment, *Psychology & Marketing*, 19: 713-741.
- Vickers MH & Parris MA (2007) 'Your job no longer exists!': From experiences of alienation to expectations of resilience - a phenomenological study, *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, 19: 113-125.
- Vince R (2006) Being taken over: Managers' emotions and rationalizations during a company takeover. *Journal of Management Studies*, 43: 343-365.
- Weiss HM & Cropanzano R (1996) Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work, in Staw BM and Cummings LL (Eds), *Research in Organizational Behavior*, JAI Press, Greenwich and London.

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of Cognitions and Affect Underlying Felt Shame




Figure 2: Affective Events Model of the Shame Process in Organizations

