Paradigms Regained:
Theorizing the Contemporary Status of Management and Organization Studies

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ABSTRACT: We rethink the Burrell and Morgan legacy by regaining (reclaiming and updating) the paradigm concept for interpreting and developing theoretical and empirical orientations in management and organization studies. A meta-theoretical model is developed to explain relations between structural, anti-structural, and post-structural paradigms. The model accounts not only for characteristics of ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology but also for each paradigm's orientation to politics and ideology. Particular attention is paid to the contribution of the model for locating debates within the broad domain of Critical Management Studies.

Key Words: Critical research philosophies and methods

In this paper we aim to achieve two objectives: first, to outline the meta-theoretical assumptions underpinning the major paradigms of contemporary Management and Organization Studies (MOS); and second, to assess these paradigms in terms of their political and ideological orientations. In doing so we present a meta-theoretical model of three research paradigms - structural, anti-structural and post-structural – that contributes toward clearer articulation of the variety of assumptions underlying both normative and critical research in organizations. In particular we suggest that regaining the Burrell and Morgan (1979) legacy helps to locate and clarify several debates that have been included within the broad domain of Critical Management Studies (CMS).

It is over 30 years since Burrell and Morgan (1979) produced their celebrated two-dimensional model for understanding the major paradigms or alternative assumptions underlying social and organizational theory, viz. functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist. Since then the world of organizational analysis has moved on significantly and their notion of paradigm has been relegated to a much-respected comparison point from which theory has now advanced. In particular, "subjective-objective" and "radical change-regulation", the principal dualisms identified by Burrell and Morgan and a wealth of other social theorists have been joined not only by attempts to reconcile them - under, for example, structuration theory (after Giddens, 1984; e.g. Weaver & Gioia, 1994) - but also, more notably, by the articulation of a different order of analysis, in the name of post-structuralism and more broadly postmodernism.

In social theory this postmodern turn has represented an analytical approach drawing reference to notions such as decentring, deconstruction, reflexivity and simulation. It is an intellectual
movement whose research characteristics stand in stark contrast to traditional sociological perspectives of structure and agency. In recent decades there have been many attempts to account for this new order within organization theory but a model for explaining the structure and content of these major analytical orders as new “paradigms” remains lacking. The appeal of the Burrell and Morgan matrix was that it gave readers a basic guide to exploring the complex terrain of MOS, their model providing a convincing explanation of the location of theory and research in two-dimensional space. With developments in post-structuralism, similar attempts to define the contemporary order of MOS virtually came to a halt (e.g., Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2003) as research characteristics of post-structuralism could not seemingly be accounted for through deploying sociological dualisms as the basis for analysis. Contributions to post-structuralism and postmodernism appeared to be premised not on the use but the interrogation of the binary oppositions.

This notwithstanding, there have been notable attempts within MOS to “rethink the Burrell and Morgan legacy” (Deetz, 1996; see also Alvesson and Deetz, 1996; Cunliffe, 2010), although not in the direction of paradigm construction. In contrast, we offer a robust framework for explaining the intellectual constitution of research approaches in MOS. We do so in order to improve the accessibility of these approaches to MOS students and to facilitate conversations with interested scholars whose primary identifications lie within related traditions of the Academy (cf. Burrell, 2003). Above all, we wish to exploit the benefits for MOS research from "developing theories building upon multiple lenses" (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011: 6). We seek to account not only for the well documented meta-theoretical assumptions of structural and agentic theorizing - which in terms of the volume of science practiced we refer to as the first and second orders of analysis respectively - but also and more importantly for MOS to incorporate the less meta-theoretically documented third order that includes both linguistic post-structuralism and epistemological postmodernism. In short, we synthesize into an integrated meta-theoretical model what previously have been characteristically discrete attempts to account for the main theory orders of MOS (e.g., Chia, 2003; Donaldson, 2003; Hatch & Yanow, 2003; Willmott, 2003).

To provide a sense of terminological correspondence when analyzing paradigm orders in MOS, we will differentiate these paradigm orders around a single concept - structure. We do so in a
manner similar to how Gioia and Pitre (1990: 588) deployed "the general concept of structure as a running theme" in their analysis of multi-paradigm perspectives in theory building. In our model, the concept of structure is defined, for example, in the first order of analysis as stable and objective, in the second as unstable and socially constructed, and in the third as destabilized and decentred. Our review of contemporary MOS is directed, therefore, at what we perceive to be contributions corresponding to “structural”, “anti-structural” and “post-structural” analysis in recent decades. These orders represent ostensibly similar intellectual terrain to what elsewhere might be defined as functionalist, interpretive, and postmodern respectively. In terms of theory and method, it is the meta-theoretical definition and comparison of these orders, or paradigms to which we shall refer to them.

**Locating the (Retro) Argument**

In terms of its own paradigmatic location, the argument made here is straightforwardly structuralist, functionalist and modernist; it concerns primarily the potential for constructing rather than deconstructing theory and method. We simply regain (reclaim and update) the paradigm concept: to respect the importance of foundational works as well as to challenge and clarify existing theory (cf. LePine & Wilcox-King, 2010). In doing so, we hope to assist researchers in understanding a range of theoretical and methodological positions and to speculate on how they can be used pluralistically in field investigations (see also Newton, 2010). As such ours is a modest, even conservative, project (cf. Burrell, 1997) and one that differs from those that would weaken or even collapse ontological and epistemological distinctions (see Cunliffe, 2003) or cultivate the more complex logics of problematization (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011).

**Paradigms as Meta-theoretical Communities**

While Burrell and Morgan invoked a specific use of the term paradigm, their model did not directly rehearse any of Kuhn's (1962) original uses in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* of the term paradigm; nor indeed any of those inferred subsequently by his “critics” (Jackson & Carter, 2008; Kilduff, Mehra & Dunn, 2011; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Masterman, 1970). Our argument adheres more closely, but not exclusively, to a Kuhnian perspective as the focus of our enquiry is on scientific communities that share a repertoire of basic characteristics in respect of their social science philosophies and practices. In turn, the evidence that is generated from a community's “normal”
scientific investigations reflects the meta-theoretical assumptions of the academic community in question. As will be seen, deploying the notion of paradigm to reflect the main disciplinary matrices of organization theory is a far more sociological and cultural use of the term than in Burrell and Morgan (cf. Deetz, 1996).

As depicted in Figure 1, we characterize paradigms as substantive fields of academic influence that are not separated by solid intellectual barriers but are instead merely circumscribed by indeterminate “edgelands” (Farley & Symmons Roberts, 2011; Rapport, Wainwright & Elwyn, 2005; Shoard, 2002). As their various academic meta-languages are, for the most part, translatable in the process of doing ”boundary-work” (Willmott, 1993), social science paradigms are thus perceived to be incompatible rather than incommensurable phenomena. Our description of a triumvirate of major MOS communities sees paradigms more in “essential tension” (Kuhn, 1977) with one another than engaged in wars on two fronts (see Mir & Mir, 2002; Pfeffer, 1997). To borrow a geological analogy, the tensional forces between academic paradigms can be both convergent and divergent (Wegener, 1968); whereas the meta-theoretical geography may remain relatively stable, resident research communities may move, expand or contract over time.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Our first, second, and third order paradigms can, therefore, be perceived as variously stable, unstable and even destabilizing phenomena. They can be conceptualized, metaphorically, as communal fields that are encompassed by marginal, contested terrain in which we find the potential for intellectual ”overlap and complementarity, as well as sites of contradiction” (Okhuysen and Bonardi, 2011: 6; see also Boisot & McKelvey, 2010; Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Reed, 1996). By way of a basic relational metaphor, Figure 1 suggests that despite a range of internal debates, the majority of paradigm research is undertaken under conditions of ontological and epistemological stability (see Gouldner, 1970). In Kuhnian terms, this corresponds to “normal science”, in that theory and method remain predominantly uncontaminated by the alternative philosophical influences of other paradigms (e.g., see Gieryn, 1983; Grey, 2007; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

We now compare the main assumptions of our paradigms on the dimensions specified by Burrell and Morgan for analyzing “assumptions about the nature of social science”; that is key dimensions for understanding research orientations in social science - ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology (see Table 1). As the social scientific characteristics of our structural and anti-structural paradigms share common ground respectively with the objectivist and subjectivist approaches to social science outlined in Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1-9) we will not rehearse them here (see also the kindred differentiation of modern and symbolic perspectives in Hatch, 1997; Hatch with Cunliffe, 2006; albeit the body of anti-structural theory is more restricted) . Suffice it to say that apart from some secondary changes to the terminology deployed by Burrell and Morgan - that is, replacing nomothetic with deductive; idiographic with interpretive; and anti-positivist with constructionist - to reflect the representative processes by which different types of theory and research are developed within each community, these twin paradigm orientations remain intact in terms of their basic definition in the original thesis. As such, we will restrict ourselves to defining and examining the characteristics of the paradigm not addressed in Burrell and Morgan, that of post-structural and postmodern MOS research.

As with the original Burrell and Morgan model, the argument advanced here is that theories of management and organization inherently reflect a "philosophy of science" and a "theory of society" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 1). We will turn to the latter in due course, but for the former our argument is that research in MOS that adopts a broadly postmodern approach can be characterized as ontologically relativist, epistemologically relationist, and methodologically reflexive; it is also work that, in decentring human agency, is deconstructionist in its approach to human nature.

For example, the approach which most readily reflects such characteristics, and which has received a wealth of attention in the MOS literature over the last decade, is actor-network theory (ANT) (see Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010; Hardy, Phillips & Clegg, 2001; Hull, 1999; Law, 1994;
Newton, 2002; Whittle & Spicer, 2008). This is a particularly appropriate approach to follow given the suggestion by Calás and Smircich (1999) that ANT has the potential to deliver MOS “past postmodernism”. In our view, much MOS research drawing on ANT reflects qualities of ontological relativism, epistemological relationism and methodological reflexivity; also in terms of human nature and agency it represents an analytical perspective in which the “subject” is decentered as the locus of understanding (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010; Hardy, Phillips & Clegg, 2001; Law, 1994; Newton, 2002).

Ontology. The first of the Burrell and Morgan dimensions for assessing the philosophy of science is that of ontology, or the theory of being. In debates on post-structuralism and postmodernism, the ontological position that is most readily inferred is that of relativism. Although, philosophically, third order approaches often express agnosticism about the “nature of reality” and prefer to make epistemological rather than ontological claims, nevertheless, the concept of relativism is of heuristic value in that it helps us to differentiate the metaphysics of a post-structural order from those realist and nominalist ontologies that characterize, respectively, structural and anti-structural analysis. In other words, relativism is expedient in that it sunders post-structuralism and postmodernism from notions of objective truth and subjective meaning, with the work of Michel Foucault being an exemplar in this respect. It can be argued, further, that literary deconstruction is particularly ontologically relativist, given that it locates the meaning of texts in their appropriation and reading, thus implying that there is “no true reading of a text” and “no text apart from its reading”.

When we consider the nature and role of actants (human and non-human actors) in an actor-network, we assume they take the shape they do by virtue of their relative interactions with one another (Latour, 1987).

Epistemology. In terms of Burrell and Morgan's second dimension, epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, although third order perspectives can also be accounted for under a similar banner of relativism, we feel a specific form of relativism is expedient in this respect: relationism. In its sociological sense, relationism is the theory that there are only relations between individual entities, and no intrinsic properties. Given its focus on the contextual mapping and analysis of social
and technical relations, our exemplar, ANT, reflects many of the qualities of relationism expressed in Karl Mannheim’s pioneering views in the sociology of knowledge. In his most famous work, *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), Mannheim followed Scheler (1924) in arguing for a conception of ideology that accounts for actors’ beliefs, including the social scientist's, as a relational product of the context in which they are created. In brief, Mannheim's relationist epistemology suggests that the recognition of different perspectives according to differences in time and location appears arbitrary only to an abstract and disembodied theory of knowledge.

**Human Nature.** The third Burrell and Morgan dimension, human nature, is arguably a compelling one for post-structural analysis, for under this order there is no unified rational subject to know and no permanent understanding of what human nature - determined, voluntary, or otherwise - actually is (see Butler, 1990, 1997). From this view, much first and second order theorizing is charged with reflecting the "infinitist metaphysics" (Derrida, 1976: 71) of logocentric philosophies, in which human agency is founded on a core of awareness and actions are coordinated from a knowing self, the agent acting within the context of its own dynamic presence. Under logocentrism the human subject is treated as either a (structural) cognitive marionette or an (anti-structural) agent of cognitive choice.

For postmodernism, however, the logocentric subject of modern psychology becomes an image that is not sustainable. The grand isolation of the subject is replaced by the notion of agency as a series of transient relations between networked phenomena. The subject is no longer unified and bounded but instead a convenient location for the throughput of discourses. Much post-structural theorizing suggests that agentic presence is always mediated by absence and thus that consciousness is never direct and unmediated but comes to us in an indirect way. From this perspective agency is an artifact and subjectivity a process of locating identity in the language of the "other" (Cooper, 1983). Rather than responding mechanistically to the external environment - as per determinism - or being at the centre stage of free will - as per voluntarism - in our analytical third order the human subject is instead relationally decentred as the locus of understanding, thus reflecting a deconstructionist position. Post-structural research based on field investigations has frequently examined organization from this deconstructionist view of human agency, in which the social and technical are constituted.
relationally through simultaneous symbolic and material systems. In research on ANT, for example, the human subject is bereft of the logocentric authority it possessed when analytically present.

**Methodology.** Finally, the rise of post-structuralism and postmodernism in MOS research has provided significant impetus to the development of reflexive methodology (Ashmore, 1989; Calás & Smircich, 1999). Under postmodernism reflexivity is considered a positive development in advocating that there is no “one best way” of conducting theoretical or empirical research (Johnson & Duberley, 2003). The stress placed on the constructive forces of language serves to question the notion that passive, rational and scientifically neutral observers can ever account objectively for real experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The linguistic turn of postmodernism emphasizes the often unstable, ambiguous, relational and above all context-dependent nature of language and discourse. Methodological reflexivity not only heightens our awareness of the dependence of sense-data on theory and interpretation but also bolsters the notion that scientific “facts” can arise out of socially constructed processes (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Woolgar, 1988). Indeed a reflexive approach to methodology has now almost become obligatory for third order investigations, which frequently emphasize the role of scientists and scientific institutions in the construction of research accounts (Latour, 1987; Law, 1994).

**NORMAL AND CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SOCIETY**

We now complete our regaining of the Burrell and Morgan model by considering the implications of their second analytical dimension, “assumptions about the nature of society”. This dimension concerns the nature of political and ideological orientations and thus reflects the traditional "order-conflict" debate in social theory (Dawe, 1970).

On expanding our analysis to include a dimension for the theory of society we can explain our three paradigms in terms of six constitutive analytical domains (Table 2). This is achieved by hypothesizing the underlying political and ideological assumptions of scholarly communities within our paradigm orders. However instead of deploying Burrell and Morgan's original terminology of the sociology of regulation and sociology of radical change, we feel it more appropriate for contemporary analysis to talk of differences between “normative” (Habermas, 1986; Jacobs & Hanrahan, 2005; Peters, 2005) and “critical” (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, 2003; Grey & Willmott, 2005; Parker, 2002)
accounts, especially given the now established use of the latter term as an identifier for ideologically Leftist analysis across several MOS traditions (Fournier & Grey, 2000).

Based on ideological characteristics, therefore, we argue that our three paradigms reflect the following analytical domains: normative structural; critical structural; normative anti-structural; critical anti-structural; normative post-structural; and critical post-structural. In MOS the first four domains have been accounted for regularly in terms of their theoretical positions and research contributions (see Bottomore, 1975; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 1993; Jennings, Perren & Carter, 2005; Lewis & Grimes, 1999). Indeed they basically reflect the four Burrell and Morgan paradigms in terms of theory and method (i.e. normative structural = functionalist; critical structural = radical structuralist; normative anti-structural = interpretive; critical anti-structural = radical humanist). As discussions of the theoretical orientations and styles of research which characterize these positions are manifold, we will not rehearse them here. All we would say is that the paradigms identified by Burrell and Morgan are not static phenomena and have changed significantly in constitution over time. Of the various schools of organizational analysis that Burrell and Morgan suggest comprise their four paradigms (see 1979: 29-30) some have maintained a relatively steady state, others declined significantly, while yet others emerged, seemingly to make novel contributions to the literature.

**Normative Post-structural Domain.** We now unpack research domains that were not accounted for in the Burrell and Morgan model or associated literature - normative post-structural and critical post-structural. These domains reflect ideological differences in works regularly classified as post-structuralist and postmodernist in terms of the kinds of MOS research conducted and analysis produced.

For the Normative Post-structural domain we identify contributions that are recurrently classified as post-structuralist or postmodernist, but which do not take explicit recourse to a traditional ideology of the radical Left. In terms of the Burrell and Morgan model, this domain would represent
the analytical heartland of post-structural theorising, albeit that its exemplars would form a natural object for Marxist critique (see Detmer, 2003). The influential work of Michel Foucault, for example, would represent a primary target in this respect. Although we would suggest that through his analysis of social institutions, power and discourse Foucault (e.g. 1970, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1980) represents an exemplar of *critical* thinking for MOS, we note also how, in ideological terms, his work has been famously denounced as "crypto-normativist" by Jurgen Habermas (1984: 103; see also Habermas, 1987); that is, for relying on the kind of Enlightenment principles he is presumably attempting to deconstruct (Ingram, 1994; Owen, 1995). Foucault's adoption of a philosophically "stoic gaze", results in a treatment of human history that is, for Habermas (1984: 106), "frozen into an iceberg covered with the crystals of arbitrary formulations of discourse"; for his Marxist critics, Foucault's work is a mixture of "empirical insights and normative confusions" (Fraser, 1981: 283). Foucault's theorising, a key MOS exemplar for the domain, operates, therefore, without the kind of substantive Marxist ideological critique that, in Burrell and Morgan's terms, is a cornerstone for being described as genuinely *radical*. This has seen Foucault's work readily contrasted with Habermasian critical theory (Habermas, 1972), which attempts both to understand the world *and* to change it (Ashenden and Owen, 1999; Kelly, 1994). Jean-Paul Sartre (1966: 88) similarly, saw Foucault's work ultimately condemned as "the last rampart of the bourgeoisie".

A kindred, yet broader, critique is that of political theorist Frederic Jameson's (1991) famous attack on postmodernism for being "the cultural logic of late capitalism". Jameson argued that post-structuralist and postmodernist philosophies are politically problematic in that they refuse to engage critically with the meta-narratives of capitalization and globalization, with such refusal rendering them complicit with prevailing relations of capitalist exploitation and domination. In a similar vein, Callinicos (1991) criticized the work of postmodernist writers such as Jean Baudrillard and Jean-Francois Lyotard for failing to take account of related shifts in capital accumulation when documenting the so-called historical turn from modernism to postmodernism. The tenor of such critiques is neatly summed-up by Marxist historian John Molyneux (2010: 10) who suggests that the lack of such economic and political sensibilities sees postmodernism ultimately "singing an old song long intoned by bourgeois historians of various persuasions".
If we extend this analysis to examine contributions to our running third order exemplar of ANT, we note that despite its status as a so-called “alternative” (Hassard, Kelemen & Wolfram Cox, 2008) method for social and organizational research, ANT has regularly been charged with being sociologically normative, apolitical and even conservative, especially with reference to the writings of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (see McLean & Hassard, 2004; Winner, 1993). Similarly ANT has been accused of having relatively little to say about a critical or radical politics of a tangible or “performative” kind (see Alcadipani and Hassard, 2010; Bowker & Star, 1999; Whittle & Spicer, 2008).

**Critical Post-structural Domain.** In contrast, work in the critical post-structural domain directly reflects third order concerns with an ideologically Leftist, predominantly Marxist, agenda. In terms of Marxist political philosophy, we can identify, for example, writing on feminism, patriarchy and the body by Julia Kristeva, Donna Haraway and other socialist post-structuralist feminists (see Weedon, 2004). Elsewhere Jones (2005) has brought to the attention of MOS the work of the “practical Marxist-feminist-deconstructionist” Gayatri Spivak, and notably her analysis of post-colonialism.

Another ideological position that can be classified within this domain is autonomism and, specifically for MOS, autonomist writing associated with CMS (Bohm, 2005; Fleming, 2009; Harney, 2006, 2007; Wright, 2007; see also Rowlinson, 2008). Autonomism represents a tradition of Marxism which places at its centre the self-activity of the working class. Its most developed contemporary expression arises out of the struggles of Italian workers, students and feminists during the 1960s and 70s, as formulated in the work of revolutionary intellectuals such as Francois Beradi, Sergio Bologna, Mariorosa Dalla Costa, Raniero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, and especially Antonio Negri (see notably Hardt & Negri, 2000). These writers and activists address debates about the prospects for a contemporary revolutionary Left, and in particular the view that we are encountering a distinctive new era of capitalist development, “postmodern capitalism”, characterized by the extensive deployment by capital of information technologies in order to achieve unprecedented levels of workplace automation, societal surveillance and global mobility. Such analysis is distinctive in the insights it offers on new forms of knowledge and communication, not merely as instruments of capitalist domination, but also
as potential resources for working class struggle. It is in this respect that the writings of Negri and his colleagues represent a significant Marxist counter-interpretation of the “information society”.

If we extend this domain to our running exemplar of ANT, we can identify recent work promoting a Leftist political agenda. Alcadipani and Hassard (2010), for example, argue that despite ANT’s popularity within a range of social science fields it appears to lack substantive political critique, a problem they suggest is particularly apparent in ANT’s “translations in MOS”. On reviewing the ANT literature, however, they claim that the potential for such critique can be detected within writing on “ANT and After” (see Law & Hassard, 1999), which “de-naturalizes organization(s)”, has the ability to “deliver critical performativity”, and at the same time “offer[s] a reflexive approach to management and organizational knowledge” (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010: 419). Using organizational examples, they describe how this approach represents a new direction for ANT research, primarily through a developing a “political ontology of organizing”.

**CONCLUSION**

In the three decades since Burrell and Morgan produced their four paradigms model the world of MOS has changed significantly, with arguably the major theoretical development being the articulation of post-structuralism and more broadly postmodernism. A quasi-Kuhnian analysis has been developed to assess meta-theoretically the major intellectual communities of MOS, which has benefitted previously from developments in pluralistic methodology and, for example, to ‘locate’ debates within CMS. In addition, we hope that our model may assist the production of a new form of multiple paradigm research. Similar in strategy to earlier approaches to paradigm interplay (Shultz & Hatch, 1996) and meta-triangulation (Lewis & Grimes, 1999), and based on a philosophy of highlighting areas of overlap as well as sites of contradiction (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011), this method would draw upon a range of paradigms and associated research domains to explain contemporary organizational phenomena (e.g., hybrid organizational forms and institutional logics; new professions and identities; new geographies of work) that occur in theoretical edgelands. Theoretically this article represents a first step toward defining the possibilities for such an approach in MOS.
REFERENCES


FIGURE 1

Relational Metaphors for MOS Paradigms:

Communal Spheres, Liminal Zones and Tensional Forces
### TABLE 1

Research Meta-theories of Contemporary MOS Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Anti-structural</th>
<th>Post-structural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Realist</td>
<td>Nominalist</td>
<td>Relativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Constructionist</td>
<td>Relationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human nature</strong></td>
<td>Determinist</td>
<td>Voluntarist</td>
<td>Deconstructionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Deductivist</td>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Reflexive</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2

Paradigms and Domains: A Typology of Theory, Theorists and Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Research Domain</th>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Key Theorists (e.g.)</th>
<th>MOS Research (e.g.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social systems theory</td>
<td>Vilfredo Pareto</td>
<td>Roethlisberger &amp; Dickson</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Critical structural</td>
<td>Labour process theory</td>
<td>Karl Marx</td>
<td>Braverman (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radical feminism</td>
<td>Cynthia Epstein</td>
<td>Acker &amp; Van Houten</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radical Weberianism</td>
<td>Max Weber</td>
<td>Mouzelis (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-structural</td>
<td>Normative anti-structural</td>
<td>Discourse analysis</td>
<td>A N Whitehead</td>
<td>Chia (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnomethodology</td>
<td>Harold Garfinkel</td>
<td>Bittner (1967)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phenomenology</td>
<td>Edmund Husserl</td>
<td>Zimmerman (1971)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Critical discourse analysis</td>
<td>Norman Fairclough</td>
<td>Phillips, Sewell &amp; Jaynes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Critical theory</td>
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<td>Clegg (1975)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Archeo-genealogy</td>
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<td>Oseem (1997)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical post-structural feminism</td>
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<td>Thomas &amp; Davies (2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonialism</td>
<td>Gayatri Spivak</td>
<td>Jones (2005)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) In this paper, and due to space limitations, we concentrate on debates concerning Actor-Network theory. However, the boundaries between critical structural, critical anti-structural and critical post-structural research domains have been sites of active contestation within CMS (references available on request).

\(^2\) References omitted due to paper length restrictions but available on request from the authors.